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Abstract

One of the central questions in political theory deals with the nature of rights. What sorts
of rights do people possess? How are these rights justified? How ought these rights be reflected
and related when seen in political, economic, and social institutions? Following the publication
of John Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick‘s Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(1974), rights have once again returned to dominate much of contemporary political theory.
However, natural law, which was the historical basis of the early Enlightenment theories of
rights, is no longer the primary system appealed to when discussing rights. In fact, classical
natural law has been all but discarded in most of political theory today.
There has also been renewed debate over the nature of public neutrality, and what the
relationship ought to be between the public and private sphere. The mainstream view of how our
liberties relate to our rights, as well as what kinds of rights we have over our private affairs, has
come under fire from a newly emerging political philosophy known as communitarianism. This
thesis will present a robust theory of rights that provides a new understanding of the relationship
between positive and negative rights through a defense of classical natural law as an ethical
foundation for political theory. It will side with the communitarian critics of public neutrality,
and offer a practical method of determining when the state is justified in limiting private liberties
due to public interest.
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Introduction

In 1948, in the shadow of World War II, the newly-formed United Nations adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaiming the ―recognition of the inherent dignity
and…the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,‖ with its first article
affirming that, ―All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood‖ (―Universal Delcaration of Human Rights‖).
This declaration did not arise from within a vacuum; it can be seen as the culmination of
hundreds of years of evolving perspectives concerning the nature of rights. The Declaration of
the Rights of Man, and before it the Bill of Rights and Declaration of Independence have each
affirmed that there exist certain rights and guarantees that ought to be afforded to all persons,
regardless of social, cultural, political, or economic standing. While contemporary notions of
rights are primarily rooted in Enlightenment political philosophy, the concept of fundamental
human rights is not unique to that time period or civilization. Peoples across the globe and living
in different eras and with different cultures have expressed that there are certain eternal moral
duties we owe other persons simply due to their humanity.
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There is something intuitively attractive about natural rights; implicit in its belief is the
recognition of a basic dignity and the intrinsic worth possessed by every single human being. But
while the language of rights may be compelling, powerful enough to fuel revolutions and found
new states, we must step back and determine whether such statements are warranted. If natural
rights are to be more than a foundation myth or cultural comfort, they must be justified.
Even with the idea of human rights pervading our cultural consciousness, in many areas
of political philosophy the language of rights has been lost. Utilitarianism‘s dominance in the
19th and early 20th centuries within political philosophy limited rights to merely being guarantors
of maximal utility, with Jeremy Bentham famously declaring ―Natural rights is simple nonsense:
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts‖ (Bentham).
With utilitarianism losing its standing in political philosophy during the latter half of the
20th century, many contemporary political theorists developed contractarian theories, the most
famous of which being John Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice. The issue with these sorts of theories is
that their use of ―rights‖ is hollow, being based in individual preference or mutual agreement, as
opposed to moral truths rooted in human nature. These are inadequate groundings for rights and
are incapable of making sense of our moral intuitions, and later in this thesis I will expand upon
this criticism regarding contractarian political theories.
Finally, there are some who see human rights as a cultural expression without any basis
in reality. For them, there can be no objective ethical foundation for rights, with moral statements
such as ―good‖ or ―bad‖ only denoting the approval or disapproval of the agent making the
statement. If this perspective were to be true, it would have enormous implications on our
justification of government, domestic and foreign policy decisions, as well as how we interact
with other people within society.
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In the first three chapters of this thesis I will review the history of and demonstrate the
basis for natural law. In the West, natural law was the justification for most natural right theories
throughout the early Enlightenment, and its origin can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle.
While natural law became less influential in political philosophy in the 19th and early 20th
centuries, being primarily relegated to Catholic ethical philosophy and legal theory, over the past
few decades it has seen a resurgence in ethics and philosophy of law. Natural law theorists
believe in an objective moral law rooted in human nature, one that is rationally accessible and
defensible. I will argue in favor of classical natural law theory, one rooted in AristotelianThomism, and from this basis work toward defining which sorts of rights and liberties may be
seen as justified.
Because of its power, we can see the language of rights used on a daily basis.
Understanding whether we have rights, and if so, where they originate, is vitally important, as
their discussion is not just relegated to the academic sphere. Politicians, pundits, and journalists
debate whether healthcare, welfare, property, speech, abortion, and a multitude of other related
and unrelated goods can be seen as rights or not. How broadly can rights be extended? What
sorts of moral responsibilities to we hold toward other persons? How do different kinds of rights
relate to one another? The very basis for politics is rooted in questions concerning rights, and so
rights can justifiably be seen as the foundation for any theory of justice. In the last two chapters I
will deal with these questions, as well as develop a principle to determine what liberties exist
within this framework of rights.
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Literature Review

As a central aspect of political philosophy, rights have been the subject of numerous and
far-reaching works. The two most influential contemporary books concerning rights are John
Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice and Robert Nozick‘s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Because of their
importance I will address Rawls‘ egalitarian theory and Nozick‘s libertarian theory, though will
spend more time on the former than the latter. Additionally, I will use communitarian and
conservative political theory to critique the Enlightenment basis of both books, heavily relying
on arguments made by Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Leo Strauss.
Influencing my own ideas are contemporary works on natural law and natural rights, such
as Christopher Wolfe‘s Natural Law Liberalism, Henry Veatch‘s Human Rights, and Edward
McLean‘s Common Truths. Helping form the ethical basis for my arguments are Philippa Foot‘s
Natural Goodness and Peter Geach‘s Good and Evil, while my historical understanding of
natural law‘s development is rooted in Leo Strauss‘ Natural Right and History and Lloyd
Weinreb‘s Natural Law and Justice. Additionally, ideas found in Aristotle‘s Nichomachean
Ethics and Politics will be used extensively in this thesis, laying the foundation for my definition
of the human good and the political life.
Important historical works in theories of rights that I will use throughout this thesis
include Thomas Hobbes‘ Leviathan, John Locke‘s Second Treatise of Government, Rousseau‘s
Social Contract, Immanuel Kant‘s Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, and
Thomas Hill Green‘s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation. I will also make use of
the conflicting theories of liberty laid out in John Stuart Mill‘s On Liberty and Patrick Devlin‘s
The Enforcement of Morals, while bolstering my understanding of the conflict through Isaiah

4

Berlin‘s Liberty. Finally, I will be heavily relying on Azar Gat‘s War In Human Civilization to
develop my anthropological understanding of human nature and Robert Axelrod‘s The Evolution
of Cooperation to build upon it using game theory.

Summary of Coming Chapters

Chapter One: Natural Law is a brief introduction to natural law, reviewing its history and
basic tenets. It is broken up into three sections titled In Search of Ontology, Classical Natural
Law, and Natural Right and New Natural Law. The first section is a call for a return to a political
discussion of the nature of morality and truth. Too often modern political thought has been beset
by moral and ontological relativism, and if we are to truly engage in the political life and
political philosophy, we must reject these concepts as they prevent us from reflecting upon
either. The next two sections divide natural law into three broad categories while analyzing how
each tradition emerged and identifying the one being defended in this thesis.
Chapter Two: The Human Good deals with the questions left from the first chapter. If
there is a natural law, where does it come from? How do we know it? The first section, Defining
Goodness, attempts to resolve these questions. The next two sections, Human Nature and
Teleonomy deal with responding to criticisms some may have due to the teleological nature of
the ethical perspective presented. In them, I argue for an objective, knowable human nature, as
well as a neo-Aristotelian understanding of biology. This chapter is significant, as it establishes
the moral basis for rights and more strictly defines what is meant by ―natural law,‖ setting the
stage for the three following chapters.
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Chapter Three: The State of Nature uses a number of different disciplines and subjects to
gain a better understanding of human nature and what sorts of moral imperatives may be derived
from that nature. The first section, War in the State of Nature, deals with whether war is a
necessary part of human nature, for if it was it could cause intuitive problems for this thesis, as
the arguments made are founded upon the idea that fulfilling human nature is what is morally
good. The next section, Enlightened Self-Interest and Fraternity, argues against the ego-centered
conception of how the individual relates to society and seeks to propose a more communal
understanding of that relationship. Finally, Evolutionary Reasons for Virtue provides a robust
account of what sorts of moral goods can be derived from human nature through evolutionary
biology and game theory. It also establishes what I call ―natural virtues,‖ which is an important
concept that is expanded on in the following chapter.
Chapter Four: On Rights presents a new conception of the relationship of rights based on
the foundations laid out in the previous three chapters. In Negative and Positive Rights, I explain
the difference between the two kinds of rights, as well as review John Rawls‘ egalitarian theory
and Robert Nozick‘s libertarian theory in relation to these concepts. In A Parabolic Relationship
of Rights, I continue to detail Rawls and Nozick‘s theories, as well as present my own theory
after critiquing theirs. The chapter ends with Inalienable and Social Rights, which distinguishes
these two different categories of rights that exist as a special class within negative and positive
rights.
Chapter Five: On Liberty, the last chapter in this thesis, reviews what sorts of liberties
can be actualized based upon these principles. Negative and Positive Liberty elucidates the
complex relationship between these two kinds of liberty, as well as proposes a new way to look
at liberty. It is followed by The Private and Public Good, which recounts John Stuart Mill and
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Patrick Devlin‘s arguments for how public interests ought to manage private decisions before
presenting a reformulated version of Mill‘s no harm principle. The last question that I attempt to
deal with concerns itself with some of the critiques Devlin levels against Mill, and in Public
Neutrality or Public Values? I am concerned with whether moral values can be expressed by the
state in the public arena.
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Natural Law

In Search of Ontology

A true understanding of politics can only begin with philosophy. Politics aims at the just;
thus, we must have an understanding of justice. Politics calls for freedom; thus, we must have an
understanding of liberty. Politics calls certain goods rights; thus, we must have an understanding
of what makes a thing a right. While other disciplines can and ought to inform these judgments,
ultimately they must be founded in a philosophic framework. Pure pragmatism is a hollow
understanding of the political life and misses the purpose of politics. It is dangerous, for there are
no normative limits that restrict its drive for efficiency, and yet is at the same time self-refuting,
for while it rejects philosophy it relies on certain philosophic assumptions when prescribing a
value to that efficiency.
Political theory cannot help but begin with philosophy. Indeed, as Leo Strauss pointed
out, the development of political thought is conditional upon the development of philosophy
(―Natural Right and History‖1 81-82). Without philosophy, politics is mere myth. It is rooted in a
deification of ancestral customs and laws without reflection as to their justification. Philosophy
1

From here on “NRH”
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emerged in ancient Greece when great thinkers questioned these traditions, and its allegiance is
to physis (nature) rather than nomos (convention).
This was only possible due to the development of the concept of ―nature,‖ with Strauss
claiming that ―philosophy as distinguished from myth came into being when nature was
discovered, or the first philosopher was the first man who discovered nature‖ (―NRH‖ 82).
Aristotle went so far as describing philosophers as ―men who discoursed on nature‖ (qtd. in
Strauss, ―NRH‖ 82). To understand the nature of a thing is to understand how it actually is. It is
to become what Strauss calls ―trans-historical, trans-social, trans-moral, and trans-religious‖
(―NRH‖ 89). It is to move beyond opinion, belief, custom, and authority and attain truth.
Through philosophy, Man can, ―start to replace the arbitrary distinctions of things which differ
from group to group by their ‗natural‘ distinctions‖ (―NRH‖ 87).
Such a view is revolutionary. No longer must persons be slaves to the social
arrangements in which they are born. Rather, reason can be used to recognize the nature of
justice and freedom and rights. Debate can be had, unlike with myth, for myth creates atomized
and incommensurable belief systems. With nature comes philosophy, and with philosophy comes
the ability to participate in a rational dialectic, which is at the core of true politics. Politics is the
communal aim toward the good, and so nature must be accessible and debatable in order to
understand the essence of this good.
This attitude seems to have been lost in much of contemporary political philosophy.
Indeed, it seems as if politics has moved from being seen as Man‘s highest virtue to simply a
procedural activity. Most contemporary theories of rights and justice arise through a social
contract, through an agreement between persons that is unrelated to any sort of objective
understanding of the nature of goodness.
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Politics has become nothing more than a framework through which we select the most
desirable public outcomes. Even discussions of justice have become rooted in preference, with
Rawls‘ original position and veil of ignorance being merely tools by which we can determine
what our most basic intuitions and desires may be, separate from particular experiences and
biases. The true art of political life has been sacrificed in exchange for mechanistic institutions.
And with this sacrifice comes the loss of the ability to engage in a serious discussion about the
fundamental purpose of politics.
Strauss‘s analysis of Plato‘s Republic helps us understand why modern political
philosophy is unable to effectively communicate within itself. Strauss disagrees with the more
literal interpretations of the Republic, which state that Plato was in fact seeking to create a
benevolent dictatorship with a philosopher at its helm. Instead, Strauss claims that Plato was
actually arguing that, before any discussion of politics can begin, and before we move to the
creation of political institutions, we must first agree upon ontology, upon nature, as philosophy is
prior to politics (―History of Political Philosophy‖ 27-41).
If we do not begin by establishing a consensus as to what the good is, politics will
devolve into distinct philosophic groups, each with its own ontology, talking past each other and
incapable of coming to a basic understanding. Only once ontology is agreed upon can the work
of politics begin. Whether this is indeed what Plato meant in the Republic or not is irrelevant –
Strauss‘ point, the need for a common ontology, offers a poignant critique and demonstrates why
it seems that much of modern politics consists of self-sufficient ideologies incapable of
effectively relating to one another. It is for this reason that Alasdair MacIntyre proclaims that
―Modern politics is civil war carried on by other means‖ (253).
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Thus, this thesis must begin by establishing a cogent ontology. Political debate cannot
begin with a debate on politics, but with one on metaphysics and ethics. Without such a debate,
discussion is useless, and politics once again falls into myth. Without completely realizing it, it
seems that by removing moral objectivity contemporary philosophy has returned to myth.
Mythological thought experiments are devised to demonstrate how real world institutions ought
to be constructed, rather than first investigating what the good is and then working toward
advocating a system of justice based on that understanding. Debate is impossible, just as with
myth, when preference, rather than moral truth, seems to dictate our political inclinations.
Contemporary political philosophy has performed an about-face, aligning itself with nomos over
physis, with the conventional over the natural. Just as mythology is without reason, so too is
preference, with Strauss pointing out, ―Orientation by pleasure becomes the first substitute for
the orientation by the ancestral‖ (―NRH‖109).
While getting too caught up in metaphysics and ethics would ultimately go beyond the
scope of this thesis, potentially being a thesis of its own, I feel it necessary to tread the waters of
more abstract philosophic concepts before discussing the nature of rights. Politics cannot begin
without first investigating philosophy, and so a cogent metaethical basis must be established
before moving onto discussing more concrete political principles. This first chapter is devoted to
establishing the modern tenability of natural law, which, though the original basis of
Enlightenment political philosophy, has been all but abandoned in contemporary discussions on
the subject.

11

Classical Natural Law

Different interpretations of natural law can be seen in various cultures and peoples across
the globe. The tradition that contemporary political philosophers and ethicists are most familiar
with however, is the one developed in ancient Greece, Rome, medieval and early modern
Europe. While cultural familiarity may be part of the reason for this, it is also because most see
the European tradition of natural law as the most developed and philosophically defensible
version.
Natural law is a concept that that originally developed within Ancient Greek culture. It
was rooted in the Greek concept of kosmos, or order, wherein the universe was seen as
expressing particular normative laws. These were expressed by moria (fate), which can be
crudely described as desert, and dike (justice), which can similarly be described as entitlement
(Weinreb 15). Under moria, people were seen as deserving certain punishments based on their
actions or the actions of their forebears, while according to dike society was seen as having the
responsibility to entitling its citizens to certain protections and laws. The need to fulfill moria
and dike were seen as necessary, as each were expressions of objective natural laws. These moral
imperatives were just as natural as the laws of science or mathematics, as the universe always
acted in a way that was in accordance with reason. Morality is the normative expression of this
natural dictate of reason, and in order to live well and not be punished by the kosmos, one had to
obey certain imperatives.
In Natural Law and Justice, Lloyd Weinreb points to the Homeric epics as reflecting a
belief in natural law that already existed within Greek culture. In a famous line of the play
Antigone, Antigone defends violating her father‘s decree that her brother would not receive
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proper burial rights and be left as ―a dinner for the birds and for the dogs‖ (qtd. in Weinreb 22)
by appealing to a higher law:

…For me it was not Zeus who made that order.
Nor did that Justice who lives with the gods below
mark out such laws to hold among mankind.
Nor did I think your orders were so strong
that you, a mortal man, could over-run
the gods‘ unwritten and unfailing laws.
Not now, nor yesterday‘s, they always live,
and no one knows their origin in time.
So not through fear of any man‘s proud spirit
would I be likely to neglect these laws,
draw on myself the gods‘ sure punishment (qtd. in Weinreb 22).

Weinreb observes that the conflict between Antigone and her father is often seen as a
personification of ―the conflict between morality and law or between natural law and positive
law‖ (Weinreb 23). She had a moral duty to act in accordance with this unwritten law, regardless
of the consequence, and by violating the law her father eventually brings about his own
downfall, proclaiming, ―Take me away at once, the frantic man who killed my son, against my
meaning. I cannot rest. My life has warped past cure. My fate has struck me down‖ (qtd. in
Weinreb 22).

13

While the Ancient Greeks saw the natural law as the expression of the divine, their
interpretation of this belief cannot be so simply understood as a version of divine command
theory. The natural law is derived from divine law, which itself is an aspect of the rational
ordering of the universe.
The relationship between natural law and the gods can be more easily analogized to
Thomas Aqunias‘ understanding of the relationship between natural law and eternal law. Eternal
law is the law that orders the universe in a rationally intelligible way; it is similar to what the
Greeks meant by kosmos. While the eternal law – and the kosmos – are reflections of God‘s (or
the gods‘) nature, this does not necessarily bind natural law to a deity. For the ancient Greeks,
and for Aquinas, even the laws of logic, mathematics, and science were derived from the eternal
law. God was simply the first cause of the universe, and if we were to accept that the universe
could come into being without Him, all the necessary laws that order the universe would still
exist, including natural law. As the later natural law theorist Hugo Grotius observes, ―What we
have been saying [about natural law] would have a degree of validity even if we should concede
that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the
affairs of men are of no concern to him‖ (qtd. in Miller).
Aristotle is often seen as the intellectual foundation of natural law, though he never
explicitly uses the term. In the Rhetoric, he references Antigone, stating,

…Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some
extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even those
who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles‘
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Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act
in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature (48).

Aristotle‘s ethics forms the basis for what has been broadly referred to within the natural
law tradition as Aristotelian-Thomism, what I will call ―classical natural law,‖ though it has also
been referred to as ―ontological natural law‖ (Weinreb 4). Classical natural law can be roughly
separated from the two other broad natural law traditions that followed it: natural right and new
natural law. Aristotle understood ethics to be integrally related to being, with the goodness or
badness of a particular entity being wholly related to what sort of thing it is. Aristotle claimed
that, to determine what sort of life is the best life, we must first, ―ascertain the specific function
of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that
have a function or activity, the good and the ‗well‘ is thought to reside in the function, so would
it seem to be for man, if he has a function‖ (―Nichomachean Ethics‖15).
Man‘s nature forms an eternal moral law that can then be discovered through the use of
right reason. Cicero, the first to truly formalize this doctrine, describes the natural law as such:

True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts
from wrongdoings by its prohibitions…. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from
himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will
suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered
punishment (197).
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This understanding of natural law was expanded upon by subsequent Roman and
medieval philosophers, but can be seen as being completed by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas defines
law, and thereby the purpose of politics, to be ―an ordinance of reason for the common good,
made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated‖ (Aquinas).
As with all other things that exist, Aquinas believed humans to have a ―natural
inclination‖ (Aquinas), one that was rooted in the kind of thing we are. However, as humans are
rational creatures, this inclination went from a ―must‖ as seen in other living creatures to an
―ought.‖ It is part of the nature of the bear to hibernate; for humans, we must choose to fulfill the
natural law. This causes us to become moral agents, as choice is needed for something to be a
moral actor.
Such an understanding of natural law necessitates a clear understanding of being, with
Aquinas adopting Aristotle‘s essentialism. Humans have a rational nature and thus ought to use
this reason to determine the best sorts of ends. According to Aquinas, we can then determine
what ends are justified by looking toward scripture, which reflects divine law, or human nature,
which reflects natural law. He then distinguishes human law from these universal norms,
understanding it as the Greeks understood nomos – as a custom or socially contractual
arrangement.
The importance of being to classical natural law cannot be overstated. Grotius, one of the
few Enlightenment-era natural law theorists who can be seen as representing this tradition,
observes that, ―the mother of right — that is, of natural law — is human nature‖ (qtd. in Miller).
Fulfilling our natural inclinations, our nature, is what it is to live well and virtuously, and thus a
robust analysis and defense of human nature must be made. Because the natural law ―proceeds
from the essential traits implanted in man‖ (Grotius qtd. in Miller), classical natural law is more
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prone to attacks based on the fact/value distinction and is-ought dilemma than other versions of
natural law.
Classical natural law did not survive long after Aquinas. Weinreb observes that,
following the emergence of national states and power politics, ―The philosophic controversies of
the later Middle Ages may seem to be about arcane abstractions without significance‖ (Weinreb
64). And with the arrival of the Enlightenment, natural law was changed further, evolving into a
different sort of natural law tradition. What I will be calling ―natural right‖ was first articulated
by Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan and formed the basis for most early modern political
philosophy. However, it sowed the seeds for natural law‘s decline as the dominant theory in
ethical and political philosophy due to its rejection of certain basic tenants of classical natural
law, leading to the rise of contractarianism and utilitarianism.

Natural Right and New Natural Law

Unlike classical natural law, natural right had no necessary allegiance to Aristotelian
essentialism. In fact, much of Hobbes‘ political philosophy can be seen as a rejection of
Aristotle. Here, natural right distinguishes itself from the classical understandings of natural law
by denying the social aspect of Man. In De Cive, Hobbes rejects society as an integral aspect of
what it is to be human, instead claiming that we do not ―by nature seek Society of its own sake,
but that we may receive some Honor or Profit from it‖ (13).
For Hobbes, natural law becomes limited to a ―law of nature,‖ namely ―That every man,
ought to endeavor Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it,
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that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre‖ (―Leviathan‖ 72). Hobbes
believed all people to be governed by self-interest, which is the ultimate basis for his natural law.
For classical natural law theorists, what fulfilled one‘s nature was seen as moral. Because
humans are rational animals, using reason to choose properly valued ends became the basis for
the natural law. But because Hobbes rejects a normative view of action, at least within the state
of nature, reason becomes purely instrumental, as opposed to an expression of an intrinsic moral
good.
From Aristotle to Aquinas, fulfilling natural law‘s moral imperatives was seen as
intrinsically valuable, and in order to reflect the principles of justice states were obligated to
create laws that reflected these abstract moral truths. But Hobbes changed the paradigm, writing
that any law of nature was a purely descriptive activity and that, by understanding it, we could
create the best sort of society possible. The laws of nature show us that each person will act in
their own self-interest, leading to a state of war, a state that is ultimately against everyone‘s
interest (―Leviathan‖ 69). This was a more individualistic, ego-centered natural law, where one
would not look to human nature, but abstract about ―laws of nature‖ that reflected humanity‘s
selfishness. Thus a social contract must be formed, not in order to pursue public virtue, but in
order to fulfill the individual‘s desires.
Strauss points out that through this understanding of natural law, ―justice appears to be
derivative from selfishness and subservient to it‖ (―NRH‖ 107). Hobbes seems to channel more
Epicurus in his natural law than Aristotle, with Epicurus having said, ―The right [or the just] of
nature is a symbolon of the advantage deriving from men‘s not harming each other and not being
harmed‖ (qtd. in Strauss ―NRH‖ 111). Natural rights are simply abilities that we naturally make
use of within the state of nature based on our self-interest. Hobbes‘ natural law roots the law in
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the will of Man, in our will to survive and live pleasantly rather than to die or live unpleasantly.
It is this sort of modern interpretation of natural law that Strauss critiques, stating that
―Traditional natural law is primarily and mainly an objective ‗rule and measure,‘ a binding order
prior to, and independent of, the human will, while modern natural law is, or tends to be,
primarily and mainly a series of ‗rights,‘ of subjective claims, originating in the human will‖
(―The Political Philosophy of Hobbes‖ vii-viii).
Hobbes radically departs from the classical natural law tradition in that he claims that
man is neither a social nor political animal. The state, and society itself, are not integral
expressions of human nature, as in classical natural law doctrine, but rather are groupings of
individuals based on mutual self-interest. Classical natural law describes the state as, ―exist[ing]
by nature, since the first associations did too,‖ and sees, ―this association [as humanity‘s] end‖
(Aristotle, ―Politics‖ 2-3). Instead of being an end, the state is a means by which Man can leave
the brutality of the state of nature and construct civilization. It is for this reason that state of
nature thought experiments dominate natural right theories and yet are seldom seen in classical
natural law. However, because it begins in a state of nature, natural right can be seen as a bridge
between natural law and contractarianism. Indeed, contractarian ideas were necessary to natural
right theories in explaining the emergence of the state, as the state was not ―natural,‖ and over
the course of the Enlightenment contractarianism eventually replaced the doctrine that had
brought it to prominence.
The final important difference between Hobbes and previous natural law doctrines is his
rejection of teleology. With the rise of non-teleological physics and biology, much of science by
Hobbes‘ time had abandoned the notion of a telos, and its influence upon Hobbes‘ writing is
evident. Without some natural end to which Man ought to attain, Hobbes saw the ought as
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simply the function of desire; we ought to, and in fact do, act in accordance with our preferences
and interests (―Leviathan‖ 69).
While Locke is often contrasted with Hobbes, and there are numerous points of
disagreement, he ultimately lies within the Hobbesian natural right paradigm because of his
understanding of right. Hobbes roots all rights in self-preservation, and this is also the reason
Locke gives for Man having left the state of nature. While Locke does describe the state of
nature as ―a state of perfect freedom‖ (―Selected Political Writings‖ 2 18) this utopian vision is
undone by conflict between different men‘s interpretations of the laws of nature, and by their
retribution of real or perceived wrongs.
Thus, we are eventually driven from the state of nature by fear and the desire for selfpreservation, for the ―enjoyment of [our rights are] very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the
invasion of others‖ (―SPR‖ 72). Locke even follows Hobbes‘ Epicurean view of morality, stating
that, ―Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good,
which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve
us in the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that
evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us‖ (―Essay
Concerning Human Understanding‖ 216). Unlike classical natural law theorists, Locke hardly
mentions being, and the only objective moral laws come into place because of his assertion that
we are each the property of God.
The major difference between the Hobbes and Locke is therefore the place God has in
their respective states of nature. For Hobbes, God is irrelevant, thus leading to a purely
descriptive and ego-based understanding of rights. There are no normative limits to the sort of
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state that can come about through the contract, as the state must simply protect the people from
the fear and brutality that characterized the state of nature. Locke on the other hand, by including
God, adds a normative understanding to our natural rights. Rather being a descriptive analysis of
what we desire, Locke adds a moral dimension to the laws of nature by claiming them to be
expressions of divine law. We do not simply desire to not be harmed, for because we are each
property and creations of God if another were to harm us it would be an act of immorality. This
allows him to declare that morality does precede the state, and that in order to be just the state
must recognize certain inalienable rights. However, such moral claims cannot be investigated by
understanding Man‘s nature, as with classical natural law. Rather, Locke‘s ethical basis for rights
is firmly rooted in his own interpretation of divine command theory, wherein it is immoral to
infringe upon the rights of other persons because they are the property of God.
While Locke, unlike Hobbes, creates a moral framework within which a state must
reside, it is one of natural right as opposed to natural law for two reasons. The first, as already
described, is that it is created out of the desire for self-preservation. There is no higher reason for
the state, and, ―The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state
of Nature there are many things wanting‖ (―SPR‖ 72).
This can be seen in stark contrast to Aristotle‘s assertion that, ―A state is not a mere
society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake
of exchange...Political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere
companionship‖ (―Politics‖ 44). An integral aspect to classical natural law is the sociability of
man, and the constitutive role this plays in our nature. Man is not seen as being able to flourish
without the political life, and so classical natural law is far more interested in the promotion of
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that flourishing though the maintenance of virtues, rather than the defense of rights in order to
maintain liberty, as natural right does. The individualism of the Enlightenment, due to the
deification of each person‘s capacity toward reason, is what helped morph classical natural law
into natural right.
The second reason Locke joins Hobbes as a natural right theorist as opposed to classical
natural law theorist is derived from the first. Natural right, as its name implies, is concerned with
rights as opposed to duties, with liberty as opposed to virtue. It is an early modern ancestor of the
proceduralism Sandel has criticized in modern liberalism, for it creates procedures based on
rights but refuses to consider endorsing a particular conception of the good life (―Democracy‘s
Discontent‖ 24). For Locke, ―The business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but
for the safety and security of the Commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and
person‖ (―SPR‖ 153). The law‘s purpose is not to help mold great citizens or lead to a flourishing
populous, but to create enough protections so that each member of society can independently
pursue his or her own conception of the good life. Natural right is non-teleological because it
does not see a natural end to which the citizens of a just society ought to strive. Rather, there is
only a proceduralist framework that protects each member of society from harm, as such
procedures reflect the rights we possess.
Public neutrality is essential to liberal enlightenment political philosophies, and is
radically different from the way in which the ancients envisioned laws. Pre-Enlightenment
political philosophy focused on maximizing virtue, while post-Enlightenment political
philosophy focused on maximizing liberty. Without a focus on public virtue, Locke‘s natural law
is reduced to natural right, outlining a negative framework but leaving citizens to act
independently in most everyday affairs.
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While natural right reigned as a dominant political philosophy through the early
Enlightenment, it increasingly came under attack. Its defense of a proto-preference-based
morality and contractarianism eventually helped to give rise to two competitors: utilitarianism
and contractarianism. Hume‘s is-ought dilemma led to a weakening of natural law, and the
tradition was seen as largely sputtering out with Kant and his defense of radical freedom.
Recently, there has been a small revival in the study of natural law, begun by John
Finnis‘ book Natural Law and Natural Rights. In it, Finnis develops what he calls ―new natural
law,‖ a purely deontological and completely non-ontological reinterpretation of Thomas
Aquinas. According to Finnis, there are ―basic values of human existence‖ or ―basic forms of
human good‖ (85-90). These are fundamental, self-evident human goods that are integral to
living a good life. Reflecting upon these goods is a non-inferential activity, needing no analysis
of function, nature, desire, or thought experiments, as with classical natural law and natural right.
Rather, Finnis develops methodological requirements needed to categorize certain things as basic
goods, which can then be discovered through a priori reasoning. Because new natural law deals
with self-evident moral truths, it is able to avoid classical natural laws‘ is-ought dilemma.
Based on this method, Finnis identifies seven basic goods: life, knowledge, play,
aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion (86-90). From these basic
goods Finnis argues that we can derive legal, moral, practical, and political values. Life, for
example,

…signifies every aspect of the vitality (vita, life) which puts a human being in
good shape for self-determination. Hence, life here includes bodily (including
cerebral) health, and freedom from the pain that betokens organic malfunctioning
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or injury. And the recognition, pursuit, and realization of this basic human
purpose (or internally related group of purposes) are as various as the crafty
struggle and prayer of a man overboard seeking to stay afloat until his ship turns
back for him; the teamwork of surgeons and the whole network of supporting
staff, ancillary services, medical school, etc.; road safety laws and programs;
famine relief expeditions; farming and rearing and fishing; food marketing; the
resuscitation of suicides; watching out as one steps off the kerb… (86)

So far new natural law theory has seen only a limited application to political philosophy
(most notably by Robert P. George), having a greater effect on legal philosophy and ethics.
However, it is important to note that in the latter half of the 20th century there has been a revival
of natural law theory. More importantly, there has been a revival of Aristotelian ethics,
metaethics, and teleology, which can help to provide a foundation for a return to classical natural
law.
While I have my disagreements with natural right and new natural law, going in depth in
my critique would go beyond the scope of this thesis, though certain aspects of each theory may
be implicitly criticized as result of either my defense of classical natural law or my criticism of
other theories. The purpose of the last two sections was simply to give a brief and simplified
history of the evolution of natural law, and to roughly differentiate some of its broad traditions.
However, my defense and analysis of rights is squarely rooted in classical natural law, as I
believe it to be the best account of the theory itself and see it as the most robust in the face of
criticisms. Thus, to justify my understanding of the nature of rights, I must first review the
Aristotelian ethics upon which my theory is founded.
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The Human Good

Defining Goodness

Classical natural law can be seen as being rooted in Aristotelian ethical naturalism, which
has been reformulated over the past sixty years as neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism3. NAEN
was developed by a number of contemporary neo-Aristotelian philosophers, such as G.E.M
Anscombe, Peter Geach, Henry Veatch, and Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. It returns
to an understanding of morality that is rooted in Aristotle‘s ethics and metaphysics, with the
―good‖ of a thing depending upon that particular thing‘s nature.
In the first half of the 20th century ethical statements were primarily judged through an
emotivist framework, with ―good‖ or ―bad‖ essentially meaning ―approve‖ or ―disapprove‖ of.
This causes certain intuitive problems however, as it would mean our moral judgments are
reducible to preference-statements, with a statement such as ―Murder is bad‖ being translatable
to ―I dislike murder.‖ In fact, moral judgments would occupy the same sort of realm as any other
sort of preferential judgment, thus meaning that ―Murder is bad‖ exists in the same category of
statements as ―I dislike brussels sprouts,‖ albeit with greater emphasis.
3
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Richard Rorty has developed this perspective most famously in contemporary ethics.
While often decried as a relativist or even a nihilist, Rorty‘s ethical beliefs are more similar to
Adam Smith than Frederick Nietzsche. Rorty argues that while ethical statements are simply
preference statements, the purpose of ethics is to remove oneself from one‘s own preferences and
to perceive the preferences of others (―Postmodern Ethics‖). Sympathy allows us to enter the
mind of the ―other,‖ and by recognizing their suffering we can then be driven to alleviate it.
However, as with the early 20th century emotivists, Rorty still denies that ethical statements
describe any ―moral facts,‖ and that ultimately they only reflect emotional and cultural attitudes.
Aside from the intuitive problems faced by emotivism, there are certain conceptual
difficulties that must be faced as well. Peter Geach notes that ―good‖ and ―bad‖ are not always
used in a manner that reflects approval or disapproval. He observes that those who do hold this
belief claim that ―the features of the term's use which I have described derive from its function's
being primarily not descriptive at all but commendatory.‗That is a good book‘ means something
like ‗I recommend that book‘ or ‗choose that book‘‖ (―Good and Evil‖ 4).
This, however, is incapable of making sense of ways in which we use the term
―good.‖ Geach notes that we might say, ―That man is a good burglar,‖ without necessarily
approving of or recommending burglary (―GE‖). We may indeed find burglary to be bad, and
understand that to be a good burglar is to be a bad person. However, we can still use ―good‖ to
describe a burglar without approving of the act of burglary. Geach says that, ―‗Hutton was
batting on a good wicket‘, in a newspaper report, would not mean ‗What a wonderful wicket
Hutton was batting on. May you have such a wicket when you bat‘.‖ In fact, ―Somebody who did
not care two pins about cricket, but fully understood how the game worked (not an impossible
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supposition), could supply a purely descriptive sense for the phrase ―good batting wicket‖
regardless of the tastes of the cricket fans‖ (―GE‖).
Due to these difficulties, as well as others, in 1956 Peter Geach wrote an influential
article titled Good and Evil, in which he used modern developments in philosophy of language to
defend the Aristotelian proposition that ―good‖ and ―bad‖ are intrinsic to and dependent upon the
sort of entity being discussed. In his paper, Geach differentiates between predicative and
attributive adjectives, with predicative adjectives being logically divisible while attributive
adjectives cannot be divided in such a way. Essentially, if I was to say, ―X is an A B‖ and can
logically break that statement up into ―X is A‖ and ―X is B,‖ then the adjective is
predicative. However, if I were unable to accomplish this task, it would be attributive.
Geach uses ―X is a red book‖ to illustrate his point about predicative adjectives. ―X is a
red book‖ can be logically divided into ―X is red‖ and ―X is a book‖ (―GE‖). To understand the
―redness‖ of X, one does not need to know anything about the nature of X. The meaning
conveyed by the adjective ―red‖ is fully conveyed without reference to the thing it is describing,
and this can be demonstrated by the fact that the adjective ―red‖ can be taken separately from the
noun ―book‖ when talking about X.
When explaining how attributive adjectives are different from predicative adjectives,
Geach uses the example ―X is a big flea‖ (―GE‖). Dividing the noun from the adjective loses the
meaning of the adjective, as ―X is big‖ and ―X is a flea‖ is not the same as ―X is a big flea.‖ If
we were to compare this to another example Geach gives of an attributive adjective, ―Y is a
small elephant,‖ we would find that dividing ―X is a big flea‖ to ―X is big‖ and ―X is a flea‖ and
dividing ―Y is a small elephant‖ to ―Y is small‖ and ―Y is an elephant‖ would lead us to
conclude that X is bigger than Y (―GE‖). However, big fleas are obviously smaller than small
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elephants. To understand the full meaning of the ―smallness‖ of X or the ―bigness‖ of Y, we
must first determine what sort of thing X and Y are. This is why we are unable to logically divide
the adjective from its noun; the noun is needed to understand the full meaning of the adjective.
Geach then argues that the adjective ―good‖ is necessarily an attributive adjective. To say
―X is good‖ is relatively meaningless without an understanding of what the nature of X is. A
good runner is dependent upon the fact that runners run – thus a good runner is one that runs
well. A good swimmer is dependent upon the fact that swimmers swim – thus a good swimmer is
one that swims well. Understanding what it is to be a runner or a swimmer is necessary when
understanding what it is to be a good runner or a good swimmer. And so if we were to ask what
it is to be a good human being, we must inquire as to the nature of human beings. This would
also mean that human beings are intrinsically valuable, as for humans morality is derived from
human nature, and, because morality is valued for its own sake, the nature from which it is
derived must also be valued intrinsically.
This elegantly deals with the difficulty emotivist metaethics faces in the example of the
good burglar. When discussing the ―goodness‖ of a burglar, we must have an understanding of
the nature of the burglar. Once we ascertain that it is the nature of the burglar to steal property,
we can claim that a good burglar is one that steals property well. Through philosophy of
language, Geach is able to elucidate an insight made by Aristotle millennia prior; that is, for
something to be good it must be fulfilling its function, which is based in its nature. We can then
understand why it is that a good burglar would be a bad human being – to steal is contrary to the
nature of a human being. This allows us to use reason to investigate what it is to be a human
being and then reflect upon the natural law that is derived from these functions in order to
understand what moral imperatives may exist.
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A popular criticism of this position has been that there cannot be some moral ―fact‖
rooted in human nature, for if there were we would not see the self-evident cultural pluralism
regarding morality throughout time and place. To this, I have two responses. First, there are
actually a number of remarkable similarities between the fundamental moral beliefs of different
cultures and peoples. For example, there has never been a human culture that praises lying or
cowardice or murder as virtues. They may claim that certain people can be lied to, or that certain
people may be killed, but it is always within a particular framework that sees them as not being
innocent. This is because, while culture can change certain aspects of our moral intuitions,
human beings, due to a shared nature, tend to have similar moral intuitions. It is this concept that
Aquinas was referring to when discussing humanity‘s ―natural inclinations‖ (Aquinas).
The second defense I would raise is that, even though there are significant moral
disagreements, this does not serve as proof that there are no objective moral facts. There is a
difference between epistemology and ontology, and just because people disagree about a
particular subject does not then mean that there is no underlying truth about the subject. Many
people throughout history claimed the earth was flat, or believed that lightning bolts or
earthquakes emanated from a supernatural source. Were a time traveler to approach an ancient
Grecian and say, ―Actually my good sir, that lightning bolt is not the weapon of Zeus, but is
instead an atmospheric discharge due to static electricity built up in the clouds by dust particles,‖
a disagreement between the two would not render the time traveler‘s argument wrong. Similarly,
just because there is a difference in belief among different groups and individuals concerning
morality does not lead us to the conclusion that there are no objective moral principles.
The natural law is determined through a philosophic dialectic, just as facts about the
world are determined through a scientific dialectic. And, like science, we must always recognize
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that a particular understanding of the natural law may not be accurate, as it may have been
developed with limited information or through improper reasoning. However, we are still
justified in acting as if it is true, as we are with scientific theories, if their claims have the
greatest amount of warrant. But to say that the divergent opinions different peoples have had
about ethics necessitates that that ethics must be subjective does not seem to follow. Strauss
comments on this criticism, saying, ―As little as man‘s varying notions of the universe prove that
there is no universe or that there cannot be the true account of the universe or that man can never
arrive at true and final knowledge of the universe, so little seem man‘s varying notions of justice
to prove that there is no natural right or that natural right is unknowable‖ (―NRH‖ 98).
Still, some may argue that any ethic that bases itself in an understanding of human nature
is problematic, as they claim that there is either no such thing as human nature, or that, if there is,
we can have no knowledge of what that nature may be. Additionally, NAEN is dependent upon a
teleological conception of human beings, which seems antiquated with Darwinian biology
supplanting its Aristotelian predecessor. These are legitimate criticisms, and so before moving on
I will address each of these, arguing for a knowable human nature and a modern interpretation of
Aristotelian biology.

Human Nature

The question of human nature is central to the foundation of political thought. If we are to
create political, economic, and social institutions to govern human beings, it is necessary for us
to understand the limits of such institutions and the capability of those who exist within them to
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maintain them. There have, however, been attacks upon the idea of a distinct and fixed ―human
nature,‖ with many claiming that humans are moldable and can act in different ways based on
the particular cultural context through which they have been raised.
Because delving too far into this debate would drag my thesis into a metaphysical
discussion, I will only go over a very brief and generalized argument in favor of human nature.
First, it must be noted that arguments in favor of ―essences,‖ a term that is often dismissed as
archaic, have returned to the forefront of contemporary philosophy, albeit under a different guise.
In 1969 W.V. Quine wrote an extremely influential paper titled Natural Kinds in which he
defended the notion that there were natural orderings to things that caused them to exist in a
particular fashion, separate from our categorization of those things (Bird). Natural kinds can be
seen as a modern reinterpretation of essences, giving metaphysical support for an argument
rooted in nature.
While it is true that humans have free will, thus giving us extraordinary volition and
choice in action, it is also true that we cannot act outside of a particular framework. We cannot
flap our wings and fly, nor can we see in ultraviolet or breathe underwater. The may seem like
simple trivialities, but they reflect a greater truth. We exist in a particular fashion, one that is
different than birds or bees or fish. While we can make free choices, those choices are limited by
our nature. We cannot act beyond certain confines, as our human essence precedes our particular
existences. Even our rational capacity that allows us to make choices is a limiting framework; it
is one that restricts us to thinking in a specific manner. We can never actually experience what it
is like to be, say, a bat. We can only know how it is to be a human being.
One of the reasons there are so many divergent opinions when it comes to human nature
is that humans are incredibly complicated animals. This is further muddied by our ability to pass
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down culture, making it difficult to determine whether a way of action is rooted in nature or
custom, in physis or nomos. Thus, to simplify the argument in favor of natural kinds, I will first
analyze a simple entity: atoms. If we look at a hydrogen and helium atom, we notice they exist in
different ways. They interact and react in radically different manners, and hydrogen atoms act
like other hydrogen atoms while helium atoms act like other helium atoms (I will leave out
isotopes in order to simplify the example). This is because hydrogen atoms and helium atoms
have different natures due to a difference in their actualization of properties. Natural kinds are
things most people intuitively accept, and while humans may be more complex, they would still
be able to classified as having a nature based on the ways in which they instantiate themselves.
While it is true that no human being is identical to another human being, as hydrogen
atoms are, this is fully accounted for in Aristotelian essentialism. All humans have the same
essence, what the scholastic philosopher Duns Scotus called quiddity, though we have different
existences, what Scotus referred to as haecceity (Rommen). Our quiddity is what causes us to fall
under a specific classification, that of ―human,‖ while our haecceity is what differentiates us
from all other entities within that category. All humans have the same nature, as they are human,
but they each actualize that nature in different ways, causing the variety we see within the world
today.
While our haecceity is in constant flux, as a person may learn a new skill or change their
appearance, our quiddity is something that is intrinsic to us. We can never change the fact that
we are human, and it is from this that we derive our moral value. Because morality is tied
inexorably to being, the sort of entity we are, our quiddity is the basis for our moral imperatives
and beliefs. We must then attempt to align our haecceity with our quiddity in order to live a good
life. This is why the total utility a person possesses has no bearing on their moral value. Our
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utility is a function of our haecceity, and is therefore non-moral, and because our quiddity is our
humanness, all people are moral equals simply due to their humanity.
This is because ontology precedes all things. Before we speak, act, or even think, we are
presupposing being. We are presupposing that there is something out there, that these things have
particular natures, and that we can interact with them. Based on our interactions we are able to
make predictions about those objects or forces. How is it that humans are capable of this
mythological power of prediction? To hold explanatory power toward whatever is being
observed is an awesome power, for it is to understand the nature of that thing. It is to gain a
godlike perspective, and such a power is the closest humanity can ever get to omniscience. But
such is the goal of philosophy. Philosophy is the historical dialectic towards what is, with what is
being the nature of existence. And if all things have natures, certain states of being, how could it
be that humans would be exempt from this truth?
Based on the definition of good given in the previous section, we can then analyze human
nature to determine what sorts of actions are reflections of that nature, and thus which are
morally justifiable. And, as our understanding of human evolution and biology develops, we will
gain a greater awareness as to what moral imperatives we naturally possess. However, there
already are a number of fairly obvious aspects of human nature that can be readily derived as
morally worthy. Humans are alive, and thus life can be seen as something that is morally
valuable. Humans are rational agents that make decisions for themselves, thus sanctifying
liberty. Humans mold and change their natural environment through the output of energy and
labor, thus creating property. We are also social animals, meaning human interactions are needed
in order to live a good life. From our sociability we can then derive natural virtues, which will be
elaborated upon in Chapter Three.
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Teleonomy

However, even if we accept that humans have a nature, many still may deny that humans
have a telos, or an end. Teleological biology has been derided, viewed as antiquated, and seems
to have been completely replaced by a ―modern‖ view. However, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the
reports of teleology‘s death has been exaggerated. Biology never seemed to be able to rid itself
of teleological terminology, and Kant noted that, even if we cannot know whether there are final
natural causes, it seems to be the best way to understand biological organisms (Ginsborg).
Richard Dawkins defines an adaptation as ―approximately an attribute of an organism
that is ‗good for something‘‖ (290) while Simone Blackburn in the Oxford Dictionary of
Philosophy notes that ―the function of a feature of an organism is frequently defined as that role
it plays which has been responsible for its genetic success and evolution‖ (149-150). When we
ask what it is about life that makes it unique, we can see that it possesses attributes that aid in its
success, whereby success I mean the survival and promulgation of its species. In a tongue-andcheek example of this phenomenon, Peter Geach claimed that, ―Men need virtues as bees need
stings‖ (―The Virtues‖ 17). There are aspects of our nature that help us fulfill our natural end of
survival, and it is these attributes that can be called ―natural virtues.‖ Fulfilling these virtues
allows a person to reach his or her natural end, causing them to flourish and increasing their
likelihood of passing on their genes.
One of the reasons teleology has been so ignored in the biological sciences is that it
implies a will or mind directing this end. A pair of scissors has the end of cutting paper only
because a human mind imposes such an end upon it; if teleology is to exist within the modern,
non-theistic scientific paradigm it must rid itself of any theistic overtones. This is the reason for
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the rise of ―teleonomy‖ as opposed to ―teleology.‖ While teleology implies an artificial end,
teleonomy is strictly defined as the goal-oriented or purposefully driven biological and
psychological processes that living organisms derive from their genetic make-up; namely, from
their nature.
The philosopher of science David Hull has written extensively on this change,
humorously noting that ―Haldane [in the 1930s] can be found remarking, ‗Teleology is like a
mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he‘s unwilling to be seen with her in
public.‘ Today the mistress has become a lawfully wedded wife. Biologists no longer feel
obligated to apologize for their use of teleological language; they flaunt it. The only concession
which they make to its disreputable past is to rename it ‗teleonomy‘‖ (280-316). With a
teleonomical understanding of biology, we can study ―natural ends‖ that exist within human
nature. And, based on the definition of good provided by NAEN, fulfilling these functions would
be what we mean when we talk about certain actions being ―good‖ and ―bad.‖
In Chance and Necessity, Jacques Monod, a Nobel Prize winner in Physiology or
Biology, describes how teleonomy is expanded from simple biological processes to relational
states and actions:

Rather than reject this [goal-directedness] idea (as certain biologists have tried to
do) it is indispensable to recognise that it is essential to the very definition of
living beings. We shall maintain that the latter are distinct from all other
structures or systems present in the universe through this characteristic property,
which we shall call teleonomy.
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[…] It will be readily seen that, in this or that species situated higher or lower on
the animal scale, the achievement of the fundamental teleonomic project (i.e.,
invariant reproduction) calls assorted, more or less elaborate and complex
structures and performances into play. The fact must be stressed that concerned
here are not only the activities directly bound up with reproduction itself, but all
those that contribute-be it very indirectly-to the species' survival and
multiplication. For example, in higher mammals the play of the young is an
important element of psychic development and social integration. Therefore this
activity has teleonomic value, inasmuch as it furthers the cohesion of the group, a
condition for its survival and for the expansion of the species. (200)

Even Aristotle can be seen as advocating a version of teleonomy when he claims, ―It is
absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe an agent deliberating.
Craft does not deliberate. If the ship-building craft were in the wood, it would produce the same
results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in craft, it is present also in nature. The best
illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that. It is plain that nature is a cause, a
cause that operates for a purpose‖ (―Physics‖). Nature possess an intrinsic cause and can cause
itself; it can be a watch, or in Aristotle‘s example, a ship, without a watchmaker (or shipmaker).
Teleonomy is a better account of how we view biology, allows us to rid ourselves of the
―directed end‖ that is seen in teleology, and, taken together with NAEN, gives us an objective
and knowable moral good.
The question still remains: even if there is this natural purpose, this teleonomy, why
ought we fulfill it? Why ought we be good? What compels us to do what we ought to do? This is
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what divides the noble from the brutal. The brutal is chaos, undirected will tyrannically imposing
itself upon things. It is will according to preference. As preference it has no reason, for
preference, like myth, is unanalyzable. It acts without cause and without regard to effect. In
contrast the noble is the direction of that will – it is conforming the will to the natural law that
determines how that will ought to be refined. Only through noble action can we express the
natural order of reality and truly flourish. And only through noble action can we express the
principles of justice in society.
This also demonstrates the hollowness of utilitarianism as a moral theory. Utilitarianism
seeks to maximize utility, usually defined as happiness or a lack of suffering, as its guiding
principle for morality. Utility is chosen based on what we all naturally prefer, and while there are
substantial differences between rule and preference utilitarianism, all forms can be broadly fit
within this basic framework. But utilitarianism cannot be seen as a justification of rights or a
proper moral framework for justice, as it is not our preferences that create moral norms, but
rather these natural imperatives. And, as demonstrated in the previous section, the emotivist
metaethical framework upon which utilitarianism is founded seems to be an inadequate basis by
which to understand our usage of the term ―good.‖ It is for this reason Foot writes that
―utilitarianism never gets off the ground‖ if one accepts this understanding of metaethics
(―Natural Goodness‖ 48).
This theory is by no means definitive, and while it has been gaining support over the
years, it still must deal with a number of hurtles. The fact/value distinction, the naturalistic
fallacy, and the is-ought dilemma, all derivations of the same, fundamental principle, still loom
large within ethics. However, I do not see them as insurmountable. Over the past six decades the
fact/value distinction has come under increasing fire by numerous philosophers, such as Philippa
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Foot, Hilary Putnam, and Alasdair MacIntyre, and parts of it have been chipped away. There
have also been a number of proposed solutions to the is-ought dilemma, and the naturalistic
fallacy is not as forbearing as once believed. While these difficulties are important and must be
addressed for my broader political theory to hold, such an endeavor would go far beyond the
scope of this thesis. This chapter was merely meant to summarize NAEN and defend certain
basic principles it espouses before moving on to the more politically oriented portions of my
thesis.
Before that however, I must first demonstrate the practical tenability of NAEN. If it were
to, say, show that warfare is morally praiseworthy as it is a part of our nature, no matter how
logically coherent it may appear, because it so dissidently violates our most basic intuitions,
NAEN would have to be viewed with suspicion. By fleshing out what sorts of moral goods can
be derived from NAEN‘s principles, I will also begin to demonstrate what sorts of things qualify
as ―natural rights‖ and ―natural virtues,‖ both of which are the foundation for my theory of
rights.
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The State of Nature

War in the State of Nature

Stripping custom from nature when dealing with human beings can be incredibly
difficult, and so throughout the years various thought experiments have been presented in order
to better understand how humans naturally exist. State of nature thought experiments were
extensively used by Enlightenment political theorists, and there has been a resurgence in their
usage in contemporary political philosophy. These thought experiments are useful, as they allow
philosophers to remove any conventional or governmental norms in order to conceptualize a
more objective human nature. However, with modern advances and discoveries in anthropology
and evolutionary biology, state of nature thought experiments must be reformulated in order to
reflect these advances.
One of the most famous state of nature thought experiments was developed by Thomas
Hobbes in the Leviathan. As mentioned in the first chapter, Hobbes‘ thought experiment contains
an extremely bleak outlook on how humans would interact sans government. However, there are
a number of issues with the Hobbesian state of nature, much of which has to do with his rejection
of Aristotle‘s conception of Man as a political animal.
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Hobbes makes the mistake of believing that we would be atomistic individuals,
constantly at war with one another, and would only make short-term alliances that would fall
apart as soon as one partner had their back turned. However, Peter Kropotkin‘s observations on
how social animals help one another, even when it is to their apparent detriment, contains many
interesting points and indicates that social creatures are capable of altruism (Kropotkin). A
famous example Kropotkin gives of such acts is a species of bats that take care of one another
and feed each other when one is injured or sick. In fact, according to Kropotkin, ―Better
conditions are created by the elimination of competition by means of mutual aid and mutual
support‖ (Kropotkin). Humans are a social species, and would therefore desire, and even require,
the presence and help of others. Indeed, such bonds are evolutionarily advantageous, and may
even be the basis for why some animals evolve into social beings in the first place.
However, Hobbes does bring to light some of Man‘s more violent inclinations. It seems
that human tribes throughout history have acted in similar ways as individuals within the
Hobbesian state of nature. While we can be very friendly to within our own tribes, that does not
mean we will be so gracious to foreign groups. Wolves run other wolf packs out of their
territory, chimpanzees go to war with other groups of chimpanzees, and human tribes fight
human tribes. All of the things Hobbes mentioned regarding our suspicion of others, scarcity,
power, reputation, and equality are perfectly true, even if designated to a group of individuals
rather than a single person. Each tribe would be wary of others, would want to gain great
reputations, and would be forced to go to war with each other over suspicion of attack and a
desire for resources.
Interestingly enough this does not necessarily translate into a pessimistic view of
humanity. The lack of resources, and the wars that are a result of this lack of resources, only
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show how we will act when our lives are in danger, as the ―other‖ is constantly seen as a threat,
and does not give us a good indication of human nature as it relates to how people ought to
behave within society. While this war of ―all against all‖ may exist between tribes and nations,
human nature does not demand it. Because of the competition over resources the laws of the
jungle require us to war with one another in order to survive. But just because a species engages
in warfare does not mean that it is a part of that species‘ nature, nor does it mean that war is a
necessary function that must be fulfilled.
Both Hobbes‘ pessimistic view of human nature and the more idyllic Rousseauian one
are problematic because they do not take into account how environmental pressures will shape
human behavior. Humans, like all living creatures, have an innate will to live, and so tribes will
take whichever course of action seems to best allow for that possibility. In cases in which there is
a high population density and fierce competition of resources, such as in the ancient Middle East,
constant warfare is apparent. But the warfare is emblematic of the peoples‘ will to survive, rather
than an expression of an inherently violent nature. This can be demonstrated by looking at areas
in which those environmental pressures do not exist.
It has been noted by anthropologists that in areas with low population densities, though
with enough resources to maintain survival, warfare becomes scarcer. In War Before
Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage, Lawrence H. Keeley writes, ―some of the most
peaceful nonstate societies in the world had very low population densities… Most of these
peaceable groups prevented intergroup disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed
violence by fleeing from their adversaries. But this option can be exercised only under conditions
where possessions are portable and essential resources, however scarce, are widely distributed‖
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(16). Dependent upon the environmental conditions present, human beings can be more or less
likely to use violence as a means to reach their desired end.
A number of recent psychological studies have been conducted that show that violence is
not integral to human nature, and is rather a learned response. Researchers at Wake Forest
University demonstrated that the more children were exposed to violence from a young age, the
more likely they would be in replicating that violence in the future (―Violence is Learned‖). It is
for this reason that the World Health Organization has gone so far as to label violence as a
―disease,‖ and one that should be fought with the same methods one would use when dealing
with a communicable pathogen (Stohlberg).
The reason people become violent when exposed to violence is that it turns violence into
the social norm. Violence is a tool that can be used, and when imbedded into a cultural
framework it is seen as the most useful tool to achieving some desired end. However, under the
right environmental conditions warfare and violence diminishes, because, as Azar Gat points out
in War In Human Civilization, ―aggression is a means, a tactic – and only one among many – for
the achievement of the primary biological ends. As a means, its utilization depends on its
usefulness‖ (38). The primary biological ends are the teleonomical processes that determine what
sorts of actions are moral, and so while aggression and warfare are activities that we may
participate in, they are not constitutive aspects of human nature. They are only actualized when
their actualization is useful for the human being to achieve their desired ends, and are therefore
contingent qualities.
Thus, violence should be seen as a neutral force, a tool to be used for the right purpose
(though it is often abused). When violence is used to achieve proper ends, and that violence does
not violate human function, then it is morally justified. However, if a person chooses to use
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violence to achieve some desired end that is not justified by the natural law, then it would be an
unjust expression of this tool. From this we can see why using violence to stop a criminal or
going to war against another country committing genocide may be morally justified. Violence
itself is not a necessary part of human nature, as Hobbes proposed, or a deviation from human
nature due to the influence of civilization, as Rousseau proposed. It is a neutral tool that is used
when it is the most effective option available, and can be either justified or unjustified depending
upon the context in which it is used.
Violence is used primarily against other tribes because they constitute ―the other,‖ and
reflect an existential threat to the survival of oneself and one‘s loved ones in a region where there
is fierce competition over resources. Thus, reflecting upon what sorts of virtues may come about
through the interaction of individuals who live in different tribes is muddled by the threat they
see in one another. To truly understand how a just society must act and what sort of moral
imperatives our relationships generate, we must look at our relationships within the tribe.

Enlightened Self-Interest and Fraternity

Within the liberal tradition, most theorists have viewed social interaction as an expression
of enlightened self-interest. People work to benefit others within society because, in the long run,
society benefits them. This was the view held by many classical liberals, such as John Locke,
and has remained prevalent in contemporary liberal tradition, as in the work of John Rawls and
Robert Nozick.
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It seems, however, that there are a number of intuitive and practical difficulties with this
position. Enlightened self-interest fails to take into account the moral aspect of sociability, thus
cheapening an integral part of the human experience. Human relationships turn into nothing
more than a contractual agreement between two willing parties for the sake of mutual benefit.
This conception ignores areté, or public virtue, that comes from the participation in
political life and the maintenance of social bonds. Aside from this intuitive challenge, there are
also certain practical difficulties faced by egoistic and enlightened self-interest. Take the famous
―Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖ from game theory:
Figure 1: The Prisoner's Dilemma
Player B

Player A

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

3,3

0,5

Defect

5,0

1,1

According to enlightened self-interest, because each individual is willing to work to
benefit the group should such actions benefit themselves, oftentimes those in society would
choose to cooperate, thus gaining a benefit of 3. But because enlightened self-interest is premised
entirely on the interests of the individual, the temptation to defect will always remain. There is
no moral imperative to restrict one‘s actions, and should a person be presented with a situation in
which they can successfully defect, they will.
Enlightened self-interest is burdened by the ―free rider‖ problem. If everyone else within
society is cooperating, and the risk of being caught is minimal, it is in the interest of the
individual to defect. Plato raises this issue in The Republic, stating, through Glaucon, ―For surely
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every man thinks injustice much more profitable personally than justice‖ (41-42). The life in
which one is able to commit injustice but be seen as just is the best life, where one can ―do
injustice and not be punished for it‖ (Plato 40). And, because enlightened self-interest treats
people purely as preference-seeking automatons, seeking to ultimately benefit only themselves,
individuals will become suspicious as to the motives of others within society. Such a relationship
seems to be a shaky foundation to rest society upon.
The most glaring issue both conceptions face is that they ignore the bonds forged
between people. When first presented with the Prisoner‘s Dilemma many ask, ―What is the
relationship between the two individuals?‖ Friendship, loyalty, and community have been
ignored, even when such social goods can be a solution for the challenges faced by enlightened
self-interest. Fraternity seems to be a better understanding of social relationships, as it takes these
bonds of membership into account.
When presented with the Prisoner‘s Dilemma, friends and family, connected through
those bonds of membership, would automatically choose to cooperate, not necessarily because it
benefits them, but because they trust and care for one another. Thus, a moral element is
introduced into social relationships, and basic social interactions that aid in the maintenance of
this fraternity are seen as virtuous, including kindness, honesty, and charity. Tribal groups that
evolve these more complex and altruistic relationships would be better equipped to survive than
those that do not, as nearly every time the group will be able to reap the greatest amount of
rewards through social cooperation. While the evolutionary cause of these relationships can be
seen as being rooted in evolutionary self-interest, the experience and practical effect is one of
altruism.
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Charles Darwin pointed this out, stating, ―It must not be forgotten that although a high
standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children
over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of morality and an
increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense advantage to one
tribe over another‖ (537). While competition exists between differing tribes, ―better conditions
are created by the elimination of competitions by means of mutual aid and mutual support‖
within the tribe (Kropotkin).
This can be demonstrated through a simple thought experiment. Imagine we have two
tribes: Tribe A and Tribe B. Tribe A is filled with kind, generous, brave, and honest people who
look out for one another and deeply care for each other. In contrast, Tribe B is comprised of
people who work purely for their own self-interest and self-preservation. They lie and cheat and
steal whenever it best suits them, only helping to benefit the community when it benefits
themselves. Which of these tribes will be more successful? Does the war of all against all
transfer into society, or is that relationship different, even from within the state of nature?
All living creatures have natural laws that exist because of their nature. Ants are a
eusocial species, and therefore it is good for them to have no sense individuality or freedom. If,
somehow, an ant colony were to decide to become a libertarian society, the ants would all die
because it is contrary to the ant‘s natural law. Just as a bridge that is built without an
understanding of the physical laws will fail, so too will a society that is built without an
understanding of humanity‘s natural laws. Tribe B would fail precisely because it is in the nature
of Man to be social, to care for his community and to sacrifice for it. This virtuous nature cannot
be forced on a person, as we are each autonomous rational beings with the right to freedom of
choice, but for a society to truly function and succeed it must build these bonds.
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There is no culture in the world that sanctifies cowardice or dishonesty, none that does
not see loyalty and charity as virtues. This is because these particular character traits are good, as
they are a part of the natural law and are therefore necessary for human societies to function. It is
for this reason that they are referred to as virtues. These character traits are ―natural virtues‖ –
virtues that naturally maintain human society and allow for its members to flourish.
Fraternity faces the difficulty of the free rider to some extent, but there are certain
mechanisms in place that mitigate its effect. A society that raises its children with a basic
altruistic moral code inculcates a powerful cognitive framework within its members. Such a
framework causes those who decide to defect to experience shame if caught, and guilt if not.
These two internal pressures increase the cost of injustice, as individuals become less concerned
with social retribution and more conflicted based on their own personal disappointments. And for
those that break from this cognitive framework, the cost of being caught has been raised, as
defecting is now viewed as immoral behavior.
Additionally, enlightened self-interest is incapable of making sense of extraordinary
examples of sacrifice, sacrifice that seems to be beyond the simple calculation of self-interest.
During the recent Arizona shootings, where a gunman targeted Representative Kathy Giffords,
Dorwan Stoddard sacrificed himself for his wife. When the gunman began firing into the crowd,
Stoddard leapt in front of incoming bullets, shielding his wife from the gunfire (Shaffer). This
was not done because it was in his self-interest; it seems absurd to assume that in the brief time
between hearing the gunshots and protecting his wife, Stoddard considered whether risking his
life to save her‘s would increase his overall utility. Indeed, such a perspective seems to cheapen
the nobility of the action.
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It cheapens this action because it degrades the relationship from one that is intrinsically
valuable to one that is only instrumentally valuable. It fails to give proper respect to an aspect of
human relationships that ought to be valued for its own sake. Enlightened self-interest degrades
and demeans these connections because it sees them only as functions of personal utility, rather
than as expressiona of deep, intrinsically valuable emotional connections. Stoddard did not die
for his wife because she was instrumental to his happiness. He died for her because he loved her
and cared for her.
As Strauss said, ―[Man‘s] sociality does not proceed, then, from a calculation of the
pleasures which he expects from association, but he derives pleasure from association because he
is by nature social‖ (―NRH‖ 129). We care for others, and because we are a social species this
gives us happiness. Those who put primacy on self-interest have this relationship backwards,
believing that we are social because of the pleasure gained, rather than understanding that the
pleasure derived is simply a result of our social nature. The reason for our happiness is our
sociability, not the other way around. Enlightened self-interest assumes that the ultimate desire
of human beings is personal happiness, and this is often justified through arguments from natural
selection. Because all animals seek to preserve their own life, they are ultimately interested only
in their own wellbeing, and will help benefit another on the sole condition that it benefits
themselves. However, recent advances in sociobiology and evolutionary biology seem to
contradict this understanding of the evolutionary process, pointing toward a more altruistic
interpretation of the evolutionary process.

48

Evolutionary Reasons for Virtue

Kin selection theory has become a major school of thought within evolutionary biology,
dominating contemporary discussions on how social values evolved. For years, critics of the
evolution of altruism have argued that true altruism can never exist, for if an animal acted based
on altruism, free riders would take advantage of such acts and not contribute to the altruistic
actors. Theoretically altruism may be desirable, as evidenced by the prisoner‘s dilemma, but
critics claimed that it was evolutionarily impossible, as altruism was a genetically undesirable
trait and would be weeded out of the general population.
But in 1964 W.D. Hamilton published an enormously influential paper titled The
Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, where he suggested that altruism is based upon kinship.
In his essay, Hamilton posited that, if there was a gene that predisposed an animal to act
altruistically, it would make sense for that animal to act altruistically toward its kin, as they
would be more likely to carry that genetic trait. He then expressed this in the mathematical
formula r>c/b, where r is the relatedness, c is the cost, and b is the benefit. A sibling, for
example, shares 50% of a person‘s genes, meaning it would take two brothers to cause the
individual to sacrifice him or herself in an altruistic manner. J.B.S. Haldene, who postulated this
concept in 1955, once declared, ―I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins‖
(Mirsky).
While this is how such a principle would work in the vacuum of a mathematical thought
experiment, in the real world there must be biochemical reactions that predispose us to act
altruistically. This gives an evolutionary explanation for the emotional bonds created by
individuals within a society, as they are reflections of the ―altruism gene.‖ This also explains the
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emergence of ―the other,‖ and why unknown parties are viewed with suspicion. They are not
seen, as are members of the in-group, as possessing the potential for reciprocative actions.
Humans originally evolved as members of small hunter-gatherer tribes in which most of
the members of the tribe were related. Because of this, humans evolved the ability to act
altruistically within society, and while we no longer live in such close-knit kin-based tribal units,
the same biological mechanisms are still in place. Two individuals do not need to be biologically
related to share an altruistic bond, for if a person is a major player in another‘s life, as are close
friends or romantic partners, the emotional bonds still generate the same sort of kin-based
altruistic connection. This is because trust is built, allowing the recognition of reciprocation to
come into effect. Additionally, because our family units were originally in the form of tribes, and
because those tribes normally made up the entirety of our narrative, humans came to associate
those who contribute to their narrative with kin, who in turn are, evolutionarily, the best sort of
people to trust. Thus, people who add positively to our narrative are associated as part of our ingroup and therefore become suitable for altruistic acts.
It must also be noted that evolution is not ego-driven. Too often people think that,
because natural selection selects the fittest, animals focus on maintaining themselves and
themselves alone. But the life‘s will to live is only instrumental to its will to pass on its genes.
Humans will sacrifice themselves for their tribe because, in many cases, their tribe is more
genetically ―valuable‖ than they are. If a person has two siblings, two cousins, and a child, their
tribe would contain 175% of their genes, while the individual would only possess 100% (50% for
each sibling, 12.5% for each cousin, 50% for the child). As Azar Gat points out,
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Evolutionarily, it is even worthwhile for an individual to sacrifice itself if, by that
act, it saves more than two brothers, four half-brothers, or eight cousins. Taking
risks for them is worthwhile even at lower ratios. The evolutionary rationale thus
favors not individual survival but ‗kin selection‘ or ‗inclusive fitness‘ of the same
genes in oneself and in ones kin. In evolutionary terms, it is ultimately the
survival and propagation of the genes that count (44).

This is what Richard Dawkins means when he talks about ―the selfish gene.‖ It is a
mistake to believe in an individual-centered view of evolution. Rather, the ―selfish‖ aspect of an
animal, the aspect that ―wants‖ to continue to survive, is the gene. For this reason, Dawkins
nearly named his book ―The Immortal Gene‖ instead of The Selfish Gene, as genes that cause
animals to act selflessly have a greater likelihood of surviving. However, as noted above, the
practical biochemical responses that may predispose people to act in this fashion can also attach
themselves to non-family members. Thus, once human beings move away from purely kin-based
relationships the void must be filled with civic-minded relationships, with bonds that exist
because of a sense of a shared community, for ―this natural kinship is deepened and transfigured
in the case of man as a consequence of his radical solidarity‖ (129), meaning ―Man cannot reach
his perfection except in society, or, more precisely, in civil society‖ (―NRH‖ 130). It is this sort
of connection that the communitarians speak of when discussing bonds of membership.
This evolution of altruism is reflected in a game theory experiment conducted by Robert
Axelrod. Axelrod set up a game theory computer tournament that utilized the Prisoner‘s
Dilemma, inviting mathematicians, economists, political scientists, psychologists, and
sociologists to design a program to compete in this game theory tournament. The player could
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design his or her program to act in any way it wanted once it entered the game, and many
designed wildly complex programs in order to try and deal with all the different variables that
could conceivably come into play. Each program would also be, at some point in the tournament,
paired with a mirror of its programming, as well as RANDOM, which would choose to cooperate
or defect at random points during the game. The payoff matrix utilized in the tournament was the
basic one I presented near the beginning of the last section (Axelrod 30-31).
The winner of this tournament was one of the simplest strategies submitted: TIT FOR
TAT. TIT FOR TAT will always cooperate unless the other player defects. If the other player
defects, then the following turn TIT FOR TAT defects as well. However, the next turn TIT FOR
TAT is willing to cooperate again, essentially ―forgiving‖ the other player for its transgression
(Axelrod 31-32). Additionally, when Axelrod looked at all the other programs, he found that
there was one commonality between most of the higher-ranked programs. They were ―nice,‖ as
in they were never the first to defect and attempt to take advantage of the other player. Out of the
fourteen submitted entries, the top eight ranking players were all ―nice,‖ with nice programs
averaging between 472 and 504 points while not nice players averaged only 401 (Axelrod 3334).
Axelrod wanted to use more programs, and interested in performing another experiment
set up a second tournament. This one generated more interest based on the results of the first,
which were published for prospective players to study. In the second tournament, sixty-two
players entered, with computer scientists and evolutionary biologists joining the other
disciplines. More ingenious programs were submitted but, once again, TIT FOR TAT wound up
winning the tournament (Axelrod 41-42). And, just like in the first tournament, nice programs
did better than not nice programs, with all but one of the top fifteen programs being nice and all
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but one of the bottom fifteen programs being not nice. The correlation between the success and
―niceness‖ of a particular program came out be a statistically significant .58 (Axelrod 43-44).
How does this then transfer to how humans evolved social norms and virtues? Within
society, it seems as if it is far more beneficial to help others than to be self-interested. TIT FOR
TAT cannot be seen as a program rooted in enlightened self-interest, as it will never defect first,
even if it seems as if it might be in its interest to do so. Other programs, such as TESTER or
TRANQUILIZER, which would cooperate until they believed it to be a statistically beneficial
moment to defect, would more accurately reflect enlightened self-interest (Axelrod 45-48). TIT
FOR TAT reflects fraternity because it is loyal to those programs which earn its trust, though
will punish programs that attempt to take advantage of it. This is why ―Love, affection,
friendship, pity, are as natural to [Man] as concern with his own good and calculation of what is
conducive to his own good‖ (―NRH‖ 129).
To apply this to how evolution would select different ways of cooperating, Axelrod asks
us to:

Imagine that there are many animals of a single species which interact with each
other quite often. Suppose the interactions take the form of a Prisoner‘s Dilemma.
When two animals meet, they can cooperate with each other, not cooperate with
each other, or one animal can exploit the other. Suppose further that each animal
can recognize individuals it has already interacted with and can remember salient
aspects of their interaction, such as whether the other has usually cooperated. A
round of the tournament can then be regarded as a simulation of a single
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generation of such animals, with each decision rule being employed by large
numbers of individuals…

The value of this analogy is that it allows a simulation of future generations of a
tournament. The idea is that the more successful entries are more likely to be
submitted in the next round, and the less successful entries are less likely to be
submitted again. To make this precise, we can say that the number of copies (or
offspring) of a given entry will be proportional to that entry‘s tournament score
(49).

Axelrod then imputed the programs into the system, accounting for 1,000 ―generations,‖ and
graphed the results (51):
Figure 2: Ecological Success of the Decision Rules
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All of the successful programs, namely programs 1, 3, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 4, 11, and 5 are nice
programs. The only not nice program that made it into the top fifteen in the second tournament,
HARRINGTON (program 8), did well until about the 200th generation before collapsing,
reaching near the bottom by the 1000th. This experiment demonstrates that human beings that
evolved the ability cooperate and made use of their natural virtues would be more likely to
survive than those who did not. Thus, human nature has evolved to be one that is social, and
humans possess certain obligations to others within society.
Even before the formation of the state, human beings acted socially. We possessed moral
obligations, and, due to the evolution of altruism, maintained a fraternal relationship. This is not
to say that there was no conflict within groups; many hunter-gatherer societies had higher rates
of homicide per capita than any of the developed nations of the world today (Gat 24). But the
way in which we evolved gives us great insight into human nature. It seems easy to root natural
rights in human teleonomy – life, liberty, and property are processes that we can see naturally
existing in Man. But natural virtues are a function of human nature as well, and carry just as
much moral importance when determining what sorts of rights exist. So, while the state may
actualize rights derived from our natural rights, it may also derive rights from the natural virtues
outlined in this chapter. Only through the actualization of these virtues through public
institutions can the ―mutual trust‖ be formed that is required to create the conditions through
which individuals can flourish (―NRH‖ 130-131). And ―Without such trust, the classics thought,
there cannot be freedom‖ (―NRH‖ 131), for the common recognition of rights within society
would degrade as citizens become disconnected from each other. The following chapter will
demonstrate how both natural rights and natural virtues become rights enshrined by the state, and
what sorts of obligations these rights generate within society.
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On Rights

Negative and Positive Rights

These virtues that become necessary to maintain social cohesion and individual survival
predate the creation of the state. Within the state of nature there may be no government, but there
is society, as humans are necessarily social animals. To speak of them otherwise, as atomized
individuals without social bonds, is to speak of some mythological creature, and any
understanding of rights derived from such a thought experiment would be just as mythical.
Just as classical liberals have argued, I will be presenting a conception of rights that
begins with each individual possessing certain natural rights. When actualized by the state these
natural rights are called negative rights, or rights of prohibition. Person A has a negative right to
X if person B is prohibited in acting in some way Y toward person A. Thus, our negative rights
are rights to things we naturally possess, such as ―life, health, liberty, or possessions‖ (Locke
19).
Based on the previous chapter‘s analysis of morality, we can look to attributes people
naturally possess and identify them as basic human goods. These would include the rights Locke
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lists, and give a basis for how a ―right‖ to these goods develops. Because things like life or
liberty are aspects of human nature, and because fulfilling these aspects are morally
praiseworthy, to infringe upon other individuals‘ teleonomical functions is immoral. For
example, life is a morally positive good, meaning that if a person were to take the life of another
without justification, they would be acting unjustly. We have a moral duty to fulfill these
functions, which, taking into account the moral good of sociability, extends to others as well.
All rights begin in duties. Indeed, discussions of duties are the other side of the coin when
it comes to discussions of rights. To say ―Person A has a right to X‖ can be translated as ―All
persons whom are not Person A have a duty to refrain from preventing Person A from making
use of X.‖ The reason human beings have natural rights is because they are prized as integrally
valuable human goods. And, because we are each ontologically distinct entities and are the
owners and/or producers of these goods (owners in the case of life, as we own ourselves,
producers in the case of property, as we produce it ourselves), others have a moral duty not to
take these goods from us. This duty that people have toward one another, what has been referred
to as a ―natural obligation,‖ is what is being described when we refer to ―natural rights.‖ Strauss
gives a defense of this analysis of rights, saying that, ―It is man‘s natural solidarity that is the
basis of natural right in the narrow or strict sense of right‖ (―NRH‖ 129).
Claiming that a ―right‖ begins in a ―duty‖ differentiates this understanding of rights from
classical liberalism. And, because rights are formed from duties, positive rights can be formed
from other sorts of moral duties that predate the state. Just as natural rights are actualized by the
state into negative rights, natural virtues can be actualized by the state in the form of positive
rights, or rights of obligation. Person A has a positive right to X if person B is obligated to act in
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some way Y toward person A. An example of a positive right would be welfare, as some people
are obligated to pay for others‘ basic living expenses.
While positive and negative rights are derived from natural rights and natural virtues,
which reflect our natural obligations, the sorts of duties from which they are derived are
different. In the case of positive rights, the duty is a positive one, while in the case of negative
rights the duty is a negative one. This seems somewhat obvious, but it has important implications
when determining what sorts of rights must be actualized in order to reflect justice in social
institutions.
If a person were to murder another person, we would consider this to be an immoral act.
However, if that person were to refrain from murdering the other person, we would not consider
this ―moral,‖ but instead neutral. A person is not a good person simply because they refrain from
harming others; similarly, a state is not fulfilling the principles of justice simply because it does
not harm its citizens. Only after we have fulfilled our negative duties and have become morally
neutral can we then move on to fulfilling our positive duties and become virtuous. A state must
first provide a framework of negative rights, which justifies its representation of the people, and
then create positive rights, which give citizens the opportunity to flourish.
Most modern libertarians have critiqued positive rights as artificial creations of the state,
claiming that because of this they do not possess the moral weight of negative rights. By creating
positive rights we diminish negative rights, as individuals are no longer able to act as freely
when obligations are forced upon them, and by sacrificing rights with moral worth for those with
preferential worth we are moving toward injustice. However, it has been noted that even negative
rights rely on the state, as without the state‘s defense they would be difficult, if not impossible, to
actualize. However, this critique has certain difficulties, as the descriptive negative rights are
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ultimately rooted in the normative natural rights, meaning that just because they are not
actualized does not mean they ought not to be actualized.
While I believe this defense provided by supporters of negative rights is adequate, it also
seems that it can be applied to positive rights as well. Just as the prohibitions created by negative
rights are the legal reflections of natural rights, the obligations created by positive rights are the
legal reflections of natural virtues. Just like natural rights, natural virtues precede the creation of
the state and can be seen as carrying just as much moral weight as negative rights.
Both natural rights and natural virtues are ultimately derived from the moral duties we
owe to other persons due to their humanity, though one sort is negative and the other is positive.
For example, banning murder would be the creation of a negative right, which reflects the natural
right to life, which is derived from our moral duty to respect the lives of other persons. However,
positive rights are just as justified, as creating a welfare program would be the creation of a
positive right, which reflects the natural virtue of charity, which is derived from our moral duty
to care for the wellbeing of other persons.
The duties that we have toward each other are natural, as they are derived from our
nature. However, the actualization of these duties, in the form of negative and positive rights,
requires the state. In a smaller, tribal society, the kin-based bonds that are forged create a great
deal of pressure on those within society to express these human goods. But due to the
development of mass society, a state is needed to properly order, organize, and actualize them;
for without some compelling force, neither our natural rights nor our natural duties could be fully
actualized.
Libertarians not only deny the moral worth of positive rights, they see the generation of
such rights as inversely related to negative rights. This view can be graphically represented as:
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Figure 3: Libertarian View of Rights

According to the libertarian interpretation of the self, which expresses itself through
negative rights, the self is restricted when coerced by the state to aid others within society. This
in turn limits the freedom of the individual.
If, for example, an individual making $40,000 a year were obligated by the state to pay
$10,000 of that income in taxes, of which a portion went to actualize positive rights such as
welfare or public education, the person‘s negative rights would decline, as the individual has
control over a smaller portion of his or her property. The self is invested in negative rights
because all negative rights are expressions of the self. Life is the self expressing itself in the
world, liberty is the self expressing its rational agency, and property is the self investing itself in
external goods. As Locke noted in his Second Treatise of Civil Government, ―Whatsoever then
he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by
him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men‖ (28-29).
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The suspicion classical liberals and libertarians have toward increasing positive rights can
be best shown through Friedrick von Hayek‘s Road to Serfdom, which postulates that as more
economic liberties are chipped away, more political liberties will eventually be lost. Sacrificing
negative rights for positive rights, or as Hayek puts it, liberty for serfdom, eventually leads to the
loss of all rights. For him, and other defenders of negative liberty, ―The system of private
property is the most important guarantee of freedom, not only for those who own property, but
scarcely less for those who do not‖ (136).
Nozick exemplifies the libertarian conception of the self, arguing in Anarchy, State, and
Utopia that the reason the state cannot interfere in our free choices is that we own ourselves.
Because we own ourselves, any form of taxation that is not consented to is a form of theft. He
chides ―end-state‖ theories of justice, which look only toward the end result of social institutions
when discussing whether they are just or not, rather than looking at the first principles (28-30).
Inequality will naturally arise and is justified in existing if that inequality was achieved through
just social mechanisms. As long as people have freely entered into mutually beneficial
arrangements, the government has no right to redistribute the resulting distribution of wealth.
Nozick argues that wealth does not fall like ―manna from heaven,‖ and that no institution is
justified in then confiscating and redistributing the wealth generated from individual
achievement in the interests of distributive justice (198).
In contrast, egalitarians, or modern liberals, reject this sort of representation, instead
claiming that the self is rooted in positive rights. For many egalitarians, negative rights do not
accurately reflect the rights persons ought to be afforded, and are instead used to maintain
entrenched power interests. This has led many to deny the notion of natural rights, with T.H.
Green proclaiming that, ―it is only as members of a society, as recognising common interests and
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objects, that individuals come to have [moral] attributes and rights, and the power, which in a
political society they have to obey is derived from the development and systematisation of those
institutions for the regulation of a common life, without which they would have not rights at all‖
(―Principles of Political Obligation‖5 85).
This goes beyond the duties-rights relationship I have proposed, as Green holds that there
must be a recognized social interest, some sort of progressive mentality, for rights to be
developed, rather than rights being reflections of natural obligations. It is true that a person
cannot have natural rights if there is no society, but this is merely a trivial point. The reason for
this is simply that there would be no one to hold that right against, no one who would have an
obligation that then forms that right. But it is not society that creates our natural rights (or our
natural virtues). Society only creates institutions that actualize the rights and duties we already
naturally possess through our relationships with other persons.
Without rights of obligation and the freedom of action that comes with it, Green states, ―I
literally should not have a life to call my own‖ (―PPO‖ 85). For him, negative rights are
inconsequential to a flourishing society or a functioning individual, and by strengthening laws
that protect negative rights the state would be institutionalizing unearned advantages and limiting
the least-well off from actualizing their potential.
Green best describes the egalitarian conception of the self when he argues,

…that I may have a life which I call my own, I must not only be conscious of
myself and of ends which I present to myself as mine; I must be able to reckon on
a certain freedom of action and acquisition for the attainment of those ends, and
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this can only be secured through common recognition of this freedom on the part
of each other by members of a society, as being for the common good (―PPO‖
85).

It is not enough for the self to manifest itself in a freedom from; according to egalitarians
it must also have a freedom to. Libertarians see the self as expressed best by negative liberty, or
the freedom from interference, while egalitarians see the self as best expressed by positive
liberty, or the freedom to achieve one‘s goals or rational desires. Positive rights are created by
society in order to actualize people‘s ability to make use of their positive liberty, and without
such rights, ―the very consciousness of having ends of his own and a life which he can direct in a
certain way, a life of which he can make something, would remain dormant in a man‖ (―PPO‖
85).
Egalitarians owe a great deal to Kant and his understanding of freedom in their defense of
positive rights. John Rawls and other egalitarians cite Kant‘s positive freedom, which is the
ability to act in a rationally designed way, as a better understanding of freedom than is proposed
by libertarians. If, for example, a person is not able to have access to education or healthcare,
even if no one is infringing upon their negative rights, it seems intuitively difficult to claim that
they are truly free, as their ability to act is restricted by things outside of their control, such as
their poor health or lack of education. They are unfree because they are unable to actualize their
will; they are restricted, not by individuals, but by the structure of society.
To give the proper opportunity to people, egalitarians call for the creation of positive
rights. These rights give individuals the ability to actualize their will and to achieve their desired
ends. This is a reason for Rawls‘ difference principle; the best off in society are only able to
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better themselves if it is to the greatest advantage of the worst off. By creating this principle,
Rawls creates a trigger that can allow for those who are restricted by their status from making
use of their liberty to have a means by which they can better their condition. And, because
egalitarians see the self as being best expressed through positive liberty, Rawls believes that
persons behind the veil of ignorance and in the original position would naturally choose such
egalitarian institutions.

A Parabolic Relationship of Rights

Both the libertarian and egalitarian conception of rights and the self have justifiable
defenses and compelling critiques of one another. This is because they are each targeting one
particular aspect of the self and are missing out on the corresponding half. We are autonomous
individuals, and thus deserve negative rights, yet are social creatures, and thus ought to construct
positive rights to reflect our moral obligations. We are rational creatures, and thus have freedom
from interference, but are at the same time creatures with great potential, and thus must take into
account our freedom of action.
Lloyd Weinreb observes that both libertarians and egalitarians focus on the two necessary
properties of justice, each focusing on one yet denying the other. Nozick embraces desert; Rawls
embraces entitlement. Nozick argues that each person deserves the fruits of their labor, that they
have basic rights that create recognition of desert toward their justly acquired property. Rawls
argues that we are each entitled to achieve the desired ends that we set for ourselves, and that
society must institute entitlement programs to provide us with the means to do so. Desert, when
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turned into the form of a right, becomes a negative right; entitlement, when turned into the form
of a right, becomes a positive right.
However, Weinreb believes Rawls and Nozick to be missing out on each other‘s insights
into the nature of justice. Justice is not desert or entitlement, rather, ―Justice is fulfilled when
persons get what they deserve and deserve what they get; an unqualified just rule entitles those
who deserve and no others‖ (Weinreb 10). Justice occurs when we deserve what we are entitled
to and are entitled to what we deserve.
This can be observed through a quick example. All people are entitled to a fair trial in
which they are presumed innocent. However, if a person murders another, they deserve to be
punished for their crime. A just trial would be one in which a person who deserves to be
punished for a crime and was entitled to a fair trial in which he or she was presumed innocent
was ultimately convicted. In this case both qualifications of justice were fulfilled; the individual
got what he or she deserved without being stripped of this basic entitlement. However, an unjust
situation would emerge from a case in which either only desert or entitlement were fulfilled. If a
guilty party were found to be innocent, that party would not get what he or she deserved, and
thus the situation would be unjust. Similarly, if the guilty party were not afforded the entitlement
that all persons accused of a crime ought to be afforded, and were punished due to a rigged trial,
that would be an unjust situation as well. Both desert and entitlement must be present in a just
institution.
Rawls‘ theory denies desert, claiming that people do not have a right to their natural
talents due to the natural lottery. A person may be naturally intelligent, athletic, or attractive, but
that individual does not deserve those attributes, or the fruits derived from them, as he or she
never worked for them. But, if we do not deserve the fruits of our labor, why is it that the just
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course of action is to redistribute it? If we do not deserve the fruits of our own labor, how can we
deserve the fruits of someone else‘s?
Rawls‘ theory is also problematic when viewed through the metaethical framework I
proposed in Chapter Two. For him, the principles of justice are chosen in the original position
behind the veil of ignorance. But how is it that those principles reflect the good? There is no
understanding of nature or function in Rawls‘ theory, especially not behind the veil of ignorance.
The principles of justice are chosen based on the preference of the actor that is behind this veil,
and the reason an egalitarian system is chosen is because the mini-max principle in game theory
dictates that it would be the most rational choice. But why is it that this preference-seeking
automaton is able to determine the principles that govern the creation of social institutions? For
this is no longer a person, as behind the veil of ignorance we are stripped of our life narrative and
become nothing more than a preference generator.
By rejecting entitlement, Nozick‘s theory does not do much better. According to Nozick,
anything we produce or inherit justly is rightfully ours. But, surely, there are things that we may
possess that were unjustly acquired. Nozick has a solution for this, and claims that any unjust
acquisition would have to be rectified through compensation. But it is impossible to know what
sorts of injustices that have not been recorded have aided in the social and economic conditions
in which we currently reside. It is impossible to know what we deserve and what we do not
deserve. How is it that I can claim to deserve a piece of property or social role if at some point
down the line an injustice occurred that allowed me to possess that good? Additionally, Nozick‘s
theory does not deal with non-economic systems that may lead to an injustice. In a racist town,
one storeowner may not deserve all the customers that visit his or her store if a nearby store with
better prices is never visited due to the race of that storeowner.
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Nozick‘s theory also has a problem when dealing with the nature of freedom. There are
numerous cases in which it seems apparent that a person is not free even if they have ―willingly‖
entered into a contractual agreement. Price gouging is an example of this, where a person is
forced to pay exorbitant amounts of money for relatively cheap goods because they need them to
survive. A person cannot be said to be truly free if they have no other option, aside from death.
An extreme example of this aspect of freedom that negative liberty fails to take into
account is the private firefighting brigade founded by Marcus Licinius Crassus in ancient Rome.
Due to the city‘s layout and the materials used in housing construction, Rome suffered from
constant fires. When a house caught on fire, Crassus would bring his firefighting brigade to the
site and offer the owner a paltry sum for his house. The owner, with no means to put out the fire
himself, would be forced to sell his home and belongings in order to at least come away from the
situation with some money in his pocket. Following the agreement, Crassus‘ firefighting brigade
would put out the fire, fix the damage, and then sell the house for an enormous profit (Plutarch
319). Because of this and other businesses, Crassus became the wealthiest man in Rome, with his
total riches rivaling the treasury of Rome. While this would be a completely legitimate
transaction according to Nozick‘s theory, it seems problematic, as it appears as if the owner of
the house was not able to act freely.
Any theory of justice which is based in rights must include both desert and entitlement,
both liberty and equality, both positive and negative rights. And while it is true that negative and
positive rights can restrict and oppose one another, this is not necessarily so. To see positive and
negative rights as diametrically opposed to one another creates a false dichotomy. Indeed, Isaiah
Berlin comments on this in his Five Essays on Liberty, writing that, ―the evils of unrestricted
laissez-faire, and of the social and legal systems that permitted and encouraged it, led to brutal
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violations of ‗negative‘ liberty…[there is a] failure of such systems to provide the minimum
conditions in which any degree of significant ‗negative‘ liberty can be exercised…For what are
rights without the power to implement them?‖ (―Liberty‖ 38). It seems that a more accurate
graphical representation of the relationship between positive and negative rights would be the
following:
Figure 4: Parabolic View of Rights

As positive rights are created, more negative rights are capable of being actualized.
However, at a certain point too many obligations are formed between individuals, limiting their
ability to make use of their negative rights. At this point, negative rights peak and begin a
decline, and it is the moral imperative of every society to find this golden mean in which its
citizens can best flourish.
Normatively, we each possess an equal number of natural rights, which are
institutionalized as negative rights. However, these rights cannot be actualized unless they can be
defended. In anarchy we may each normatively have full control over our negative right to
property, but, because there is no coercive force to prevent that right from being infringed upon,
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the right is unable to be actualized. Thus, we must create certain positive rights in order to
actualize our negative ones. For example, we obligate individuals to serve in the military through
the draft in dire times of war in order to protect our negative rights from being lost, or obligate
persons in society to refrain from harming others.
However, the parabolic relationship of rights does not lead to some sort of minarchist
state, seeing military obligation and respecting the rights of others as the only positive rights to
which people have access. Oftentimes, the effects of different policies concerning rights are
looked at only from the level of the individual. At this point, it seems obvious that creating an
obligation between persons reduces our ability to make use of our negative rights. But this is a
poor way of understanding how rights should be instituted. Rights must be looked at on the
aggregate level to have a full grasp of the effects they may have, as we are socially
interconnected beings, and our rights are incapable of being fully understood from within a
vacuum. This is what MacIntyre noted in Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced
Modernity, emphasizing that,

human beings are essentially sociable, that I achieve whatever I achieve as an
individual by being and acting as an individual who is bound to others through a
variety of familial, social, and political relationships expressed in a joint activity
aimed at achieving our common good. My good therefore is the good of someone
who is a part of an ordered set of social wholes. My own good can only be
achieved in and through the achievement of the common good… (qtd. in McLean
300)
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We are incapable of defending or making use of our rights or pursuing desired goods as
atomistic, isolated individuals. When dealing with crime, for example, we cannot only look at the
action, the infringement of rights, but the climate in which the crime occurred. Areas in which
crime are high suffer normally from this social ill due to low education, high unemployment, and
rampant drug addiction. If we hope to protect people‘s negative rights, the solution is not to
create harsher laws against this sort of criminal activity, as the crime is a symptom of a greater
disease.
The solution, the way to protect the negative rights of those being negatively affected by
criminal activity, is to create positive rights. By investing in education, by instituting short-term
welfare programs, and by helping those with drug problems overcome their addictions, we see
both the actualization of negative and positive rights. Negative rights become actualized because
less people are harmed by crime, while positive rights are actualized as people now have access
to education and social services.
But negative and positive rights do not only have a positive relationship in the cases that
involve criminal activity. An argument from fear, derived from Nozick‘s own theory of rights,
can be used to demonstrate how positive rights like unemployment benefits or social security can
be justified. Nozick points out that, while certain actions can be compensated for, the fear that is
induced cannot be (70). Additionally, a particular individual does not necessarily have to cause a
person fear; rather, a state of affairs can lead a person to live in a state of fear. This is a loss of
negative rights, as some outside force, whether a person or state of affairs, has caused people
harm. If one person threatened another to the point of instilling fear in them, they can be
prosecuted, as they have harmed that person. Similarly, social situations can lead to this
infringement of rights.
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A society that does not contain a safety net, especially for those who are most
disadvantaged, causes its citizens to live in a constant state of fear. Thus, positive rights to things
like unemployment benefits and social security can be justified, as they actualize our negative
right to not live in a state of fear. Obviously it is impossible to fully rid society of fear, but
certain social institutions can be created that help minimize its prevalence.
Positive rights are the actualization of natural virtues, expressed by society through the
state. Marriage, for example, is a positive right, creating obligations between two individuals, as
well as obligations in the form of recognition by the rest in society. This positive right is
expression of the virtue of love. Welfare is the expression of the natural virtue of charity or
kindness. Public education is the expression of the natural virtue of education. Each legitimate
positive right can be viewed as expressing the natural obligations we already owe our fellow
citizens in the form of a government institution.
But, at a certain point the number of positive rights actualized begins to limit our ability
to make use of our negative rights. Create too many entitlements, and society loses its sense of
desert. Generate too many positive rights, and people become bogged down by all the obligations
they have toward one another. There must be a balance reached between the actualization of too
many or too few positive rights, which can only be discovered through trial and error.
While positive and negative rights are the primary sorts of rights we possess, there are
two other important categories of rights that buttress them. In fact, these two rights give us the
ability to gauge whether we have created too many positive rights by organizing a strict
framework of firm and constant rights.
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Inalienable and Social Rights

Within natural rights, there exist a special category of rights called inalienable rights.
Unlike other sorts of rights, these are rights that not even the rights bearer is normatively able to
cede. For example, we consider property and liberty to be natural rights. Yet if the population of
South Carolina were to vote to add a 5% sales tax on goods we would not find it morally
objectionable even though it infringes upon this right to property, as when we enter into a social
contract we cede certain rights in the creation of the state. However, if in the early 1800‘s the
population of South Carolina were to vote to strip all African Americans of their liberty and
enslave them, we would intuitively see this is an unjust abuse of the democratic process. This is
because in the second case certain individuals are being stripped of their inalienable rights,
which can never occur in a just society.
What is it that constitutes an inalienable right? Inalienable rights are rights that arise due
to integral aspects that form our human dignity. The loss of humanity, through the loss of one‘s
life or basic worth as a human being is inalienable and therefore cannot be normatively lost
through any action taken by the polity. Our worth comes from our human nature, which can
never be lost due to any action others may take. The self is rooted in a human foundation; the self
can never rid itself of its human essence. Humanness is an intrinsic and necessary attribute we all
share, and, as established in Chapter Two, is where we derive our moral worth.
This translates into three rights that must always be protected and can never be taken
away from a member of a just society. We cannot lose our right to life, as without it we would
cease to be; we cannot lose our right to personhood, as without it we would lose our free agency;
we cannot lose our moral equality, as without it we are demoted to being lesser moral beings.
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Each of these three inalienable rights can be seen as being rooted in Kant‘s second
formulation of the categorical imperative, ―So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own
person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only…‖ (Curtis
46). This is because human beings are intrinsically valuable and must be seen as ends in
themselves. As Ernst Cassier put it,

There is, at least, one right that cannot be ceded or abandoned: the right to
personality. … If a man could give up his personality he would cease being a
moral being. … There is no pactum subjectionis, no act of submission by which
man can give up the state of free agent and enslave himself. For by such an act of
renunciation he would give up that very character which constitutes his nature and
essence: he would lose his humanity‖ (Cassier 175).

Because of our intrinsic value, life must be seen as inalienable, for as Kant notes,
―Someone who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent
with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from
painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to
the end of life. But a human being is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used
merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in itself‖ (―The
Metaphysics of Morals‖ 88). This means that institutions such as the death penalty or euthanasia
ought to be banned, as they would infringe upon the inalienable rights of the rights-bearer. A
person cannot be killed, and cannot even kill themselves, without being used as a means to some
end.
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We have an inalienable right to personhood because it is impossible for an individual not
to maintain cognitive autonomy. We are each ontologically distinct entities, and even when
enslaved a person is free in his or her mind. Seneca the Younger claimed that ―It is a mistake to
imagine that slavery pervades a man's whole being; the better part of him is exempt from it: the
body indeed is subjected and in the power of a master, but the mind is independent, and indeed is
so free and wild, that it cannot be restrained even by this prison of the body, wherein it is
confined‖ (Seneca 69). Thus slavery and other forms of bondage cannot be allowed within a just
society. Additionally, freedom of expression must be held as sacrosanct, as it is an expression of
that autonomous self.
Finally, moral equality is inalienable because a person‘s moral worth is not derived from
the status of the agent or what actions the agent may have taken. A person‘s moral worth is not
derived from these accidental attributes, but from the intrinsic human nature possessed. We do
not have moral worth because of the sorts of things we produce, or what our overall utility may
be; rather, we possess moral worth simply because we are human beings. And, because the self is
grounded in the human essence, a person can never lose their humanness. Thus, it is impossible
for one person to become less morally valuable than another, as each person‘s moral worth is
derived from the same human nature.
This necessitates a democratic form of government, as every person must have equal say
in the actions taken by the government. Because we each relinquish an equal number of natural
rights in the creation of the state, we have essentially bought ―stock‖ in the government, meaning
that, as ―share-holders,‖ we ought to have a say in how it is run. Additionally, any social
institution created, such as education, marriage, and the military, must be open to all people as
long as some quality they possess does not restrict their ability to participate in or qualify for said
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institution. However, trivial differences that are integral to that particular individual, such as
racial/ethnic background, sex, or sexual orientation, cannot be used to exclude the person from
participation in these institutions. This is the reasoning behind why segregation, even when
accepted by the majority, must be rejected in the interests of justice.
An important practical effect that ought to be noted is how inalienable rights affect tax
policy. The top tax rate would have to be capped at 50%, for if individuals were to be compelled
to pay more than half of their earnings to the government, they would be working for society
rather than themselves. As articulated by Locke, property is an extension of the self, and if
people are to be treated as ends in themselves they must have decision-making power over most
of the wealth they generate. There are two sorts of slavery that exist: ―hard slavery‖ and ―soft
slavery.‖ A person is enslaved when they are coerced in a way in which they become a means to
another group or individual. If their person were turned into the property of another group or
individual through the use of force, as with slaves in the American antebellum South, then it
would be characterized as ―hard slavery.‖ But if a person were to have the majority of their labor
turned into the property of anther group or individual, this would be characterized as ―soft
slavery.‖ The most common form of this is wage slavery, but it is not only restricted to the
poorest in society.
People must have full control over the majority of their wages, for if they did not they
would not have control over an expression of themselves. During the Gilded Age, there were
instances in which workers were paid in company scrips that could only be redeemed in
company stores (VandeCreek). While they were able to purchase goods, they did not have full
discretion as to where they wanted to spend their money, and thus were in a state of soft slavery.
Similarly, some may say that the wealthy receive much of what they pay in taxes back in the
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form of social services. But the infringement does not come from the benefit derived from the
labor; it comes from the lack of ability to have complete control over what the benefit may be.
Inalienable rights also give us a mechanism by which to judge a people‘s right to
revolution. Those within a particular society have the right to revolution if and only if their
inalienable rights are being infringed upon and it seems unreasonable to assume that these rights
could be regained through the use of the legal process. For those living in Nazi Germany who
had lost their inalienable rights, it did not seem possible for their rights to be regained through
Nazi legal institutions. Thus, any revolution within Nazi Germany would have been fully
justified.
However, things change when looking at revolution within democratic regimes. If we
take the Civil Rights movement, we can see that it was a movement organized to redress the
wrongs committed against African Americans and to regain certain inalienable rights that had
been infringed upon. However, because they lived in a democracy, which necessarily contains
the possibility for reform within existing institutions, violent revolution would not be justified. It
was reasonable to assume, even at the United States‘ founding, that liberties that were not
originally afforded to minorities and other groups would eventually be extended to those groups.
Violent revolutions based on the loss of inalienable rights are thus only justifiable in nondemocratic regimes; within democratic ones the mechanisms needed for peaceful reform already
exist.
Just as inalienable rights exist as a special category within natural rights, social rights
exist as a special category within natural virtues. Social rights are rights without which we would
be unable to properly maintain our inalienable rights, and so, like inalienable rights, they must be
maintained if any state is going to have even the most rudimentary claim to justice. These would
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include rights such as the right to a fair trial or the right against unwarranted or extreme search
and seizure. These are social obligations we hold to one another and cannot be justified as
natural rights, but are necessary to maintain our inalienable rights. James Madison spoke of
social rights while introducing the Bill of Rights to Congress, stating that, ―Trial by jury cannot
be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a social compact which regulates the
action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the
pre-existent rights of nature‖ (―Bill of Rights‖).
To sum up this chapter: positive and negative rights must be weighed and balanced
against one another in order to have a proper ordering of rights. Each represents the actualization
of a basic category of moral obligations, with negative rights reflecting natural rights and
positive rights reflecting natural virtues. As positive rights are actualized, the aggregate level of
negative rights that have the opportunity to actualize increases, but at a certain point too many
obligations are created and people are no longer able to make use of their negative rights.
Additionally, within negative and positive rights there are special sorts of rights: inalienable and
social rights. These rights are reflections of humanity‘s basic dignity and moral value, and are
rights that can never be altered in a just society.
In the end, rights are only valuable insofar as they respect the dignity of persons, meaning
that they are the means that allow individuals to make use of liberty, which in turn gives those
individuals the opportunity to flourish. But a remaining question that must be dealt with is how
that liberty relates to the rights that are created. Do rights always actualize liberty, and if so, what
kind? And is the state ever justified in regulating individuals‘ private behavior? The next chapter
will deal with these questions, and propose a method by which legislatures can determine
whether a certain right ought to be actualized.
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On Liberty

Negative and Positive Liberty

As was defined earlier, negative liberty is freedom from; it is the liberty a person enjoys
when there are no infringements upon his or her ability to do what he or she chooses. Hobbes‘
definition of freedom is of this negative sort, with him stating that, ―Liberty, or Freedome,
signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of
motion;)‖ (―Leviathan‖ 147). For libertarians, negative liberty is a necessary prerequisite in any
system that deals with rights or justice, as moral choices cannot be made without them. We
cannot understand what it is to seek justice or possess a right without first making a moral
choice, leading Tibor Machan to state that such moral choices are secured when, ―the rights of
the individual members of a human community to life, to voluntary action (or to liberty of
conduct), and to property are universally respected, observed, and defended‖ (46).
In contrast, positive liberty is freedom to; it is the liberty a person enjoys when they are
capable of actualizing some rationally desired goal. When making the distinction between
positive and negative liberty in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, Isaiah Berlin describes
positive liberty as, ―The freedom which consists in being one‘s own master,‖ where I am capable
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of, ―conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them‖ (―Liberty‖ 161). Negative
liberty is seen as ―crude‖ by egalitarians and communitarians, as it does not take into account the
freedom to achieve one‘s potential and gain mastery over oneself. T. H. Green argues that, ―the
mere removal of compulsion, the mere enabling a man to do as he likes, is in itself no
contribution to true freedom…the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all
members of human society alike to make the best of themselves‖ (―Liberal Legislation‖ 199).
Both positive liberty and negative liberty seem to be necessary norms within a
democratic society. They are both at the heart of the metaphysical notion of democracy. Negative
liberty asks, ―What can others do to me?‖ while positive liberty asks, ―What can I do?‖
Democracy seeks to balance these two forms of liberty, which paradoxically appear to both
contradict and sustain each other. It is only in democracy that positive and negative liberty are
able to fully actualize their respective goods of equality and freedom. For in a democracy, we
believe that we can rule ourselves without ourselves being ruled, or, to put it in different terms,
we attempt to gain mastery over society while preventing society from gaining mastery over us.
This is what Alexis de Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America, saying,

It is possible to imagine an extreme point at which freedom and equality would
meet and be confounded together. Let us suppose that all the members of the
community take a part in the government, and that each of them has an equal right
to take a part in it. As none is different from his fellows, none can exercise a
tyrannical power: men will be perfectly free, because they will all be entirely
equal; and they will all be perfectly equal, because they will be entirely free. To
this ideal state democratic nations tend (Tocqueville).
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This foundational democratic concept has an interesting parallel in Immanuel Kant‘s
work on the ethics of love. Kant argues that, because human beings are ends in themselves, and
because treating a person solely as a means to one‘s ends is immoral, a sexual relationship whose
purpose is pleasure is immoral. This is because body parts, or even the body as a whole, cannot
be disconnected for the person, as persons are one intrinsically valuable, wholly integrated unit.
Thus, when we give a part of ourselves up to another during sexual activity, namely our bodies,
we are instrumentalizing our value (―Duties Toward the Body‖ 286-287).
Kant then argues that the only time in which sexual activity can be justified is within the
institution of marriage. This is because when two individuals are wed, they enter into the
institution as free and equal partners. They give themselves to each other, wholly and
unconditionally, and through this process are now able to participate in sexual activity while
maintaining their value as ends in themselves. Because each owns the other, neither is owned by
anyone, protecting the dignity of both persons (―Duties Toward the Body‖ 287-288). In a sense,
this is the sort of unity we seek when setting up a democratic regime.
We wed ourselves to society, all entering into the contract as free and equal persons. By
giving ourselves to one another, we give ourselves to no one. Because Man is social, he must live
with others, but because he is rational, he seeks to make decisions for himself. It is the perfect
intersection of these fundamental human goods that allows us to make use of our dignity. And
for the liberties associated with both of these attributes to be actualized in a complementary
fashion, a democracy must exist, as within a democracy Man can both give himself to others and
be ruled by none. This ideal that Tocqueville spoke of in regards to democracy can also be seen
as the ideals of justice, rights, and liberty. As desert and entitlement reach their ―extreme point‖
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perfect justice is actualized; as negative rights and positive rights reach their ―extreme point‖ the
parabolic relationship emerges; as negative liberty and positive liberty reach their ―extreme
point‖ a holistic understanding of liberty comes into being.
Throughout this thesis I have made a number of dichotomous distinctions which I find
expressed in either libertarian or egalitarian political theory. Each sphere of thought focuses on
one of these two categories, while rejecting the other. It is part of the purpose of this work to find
the golden mean between the two, as both foundations are needed. The following table is a
representation of the relevant distinctions made between libertarianism and egalitarianism, as
well as the corresponding ideas I have been proposing:
Figure 5: Relationship of Human Goods
Libertarianism

Natural Law

Egalitarianism

Desert

Justice

Entitlement

Freedom

Dignity

Equality

Negative Rights

Parabolic Rights

Positive Rights

Negative Liberty

Holistic Liberty

Positive Liberty

To properly understand each of these values, we must investigate how each can inform
the other and even aid in each other‘s maintenance. But in contemporary liberal theory,
libertarianism and egalitarianism seem to have attempted to rid themselves of the values of the
other. This dichotomy is at the core of the dispute between libertarianism and egalitarianism and
is thus important in the discussion of rights and liberties. And, as demonstrated in this table,
there are commonalities between negative and positive liberty, and it is the purpose of
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democratic regimes to reflect a holistic understanding of liberty – one that takes into account the
autonomous self and the potential each self holds.
Siding with one form of liberty over the other misses out on valuable contributions that
both make to the concept of liberty, and in many cases makes the discussion of liberty absurd.
Negative liberty makes little sense, for when isolated it can become contradictory. Negative
liberty holds that autonomy is the greatest good, that each individual must be treated as an
individual, and that any sort of law that prevents us from doing whatever we may choose to do is
unjust. But under this framework, it seems as if banning a crime such as murder would be
unjustified, as by doing so we would be infringing upon the liberty of another. If we were to
create a law that banned murder, we would have to use force and coercion to prevent those who
would like to murder from murdering.
Some may say that this is an unfair critique, that such an imposition is justified because
the murderer is attempting to infringe upon the liberty of another. But as Ronald Dworkin points
out, law ―diminishes a man‘s liberty when we prevent him from talking or making love as he
wishes, but it also diminishes his liberty when we prevent him from murdering or defaming
others‖ (Rosen & Wolff 130). It does not matter that the murderer is seeking to infringe upon the
liberty of another person to live; the point is that regardless as to whether we prevent the
murderer from killing or do not, someone‘s liberty will be lost, as, ―Every law curtails some
liberty, although it may be a means to increase another‖ (―Liberty‖ 41). It is true, as Berlin
humorously noted, that ―freedom for the pike is death for the minnows‖ (―Liberty‖ 173).
Liberty as autonomy, or negative liberty, cannot be the sole principle by which we create
laws that govern personal behavior, for if it were we would have no basis to govern any behavior
at all. To ensure the liberty of some, the full autonomy of others must be diminished, as ―There is
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no relation of man to man in which man is absolutely free to act how he pleases or how it suits
him‖ (―NRH‖ 129). While ―Man‘s freedom is accompanied by a sacred awe‖ (―NRH‖ 130), it
must be restricted, as with it comes ―a kind of divination that not everything is permitted‖
(―NRH‖ 130). What Strauss calls our ―natural conscience‖ is the inner voice or intuition which
reflects the moral law, as it is an aspect of our nature, thus making ―restraint…as natural or as
primeval as freedom‖ (―NRH‖ 130).
Another critique of negative liberty comes from positive liberty itself, though it
eventually leads positive liberty down its own path of contradictions. Positive liberty can be
understood as a self-mastery, where reason governs the passions. While positive liberty is about
achieving one‘s ends, one‘s potential, those ends must be rationally determined. As Berlin points
out, if positive liberty asks, ―What can I do?‖ it is inevitably led to the question ―Who is my
master?‖ (―Liberty‖ 36). Even if there is no outside force controlling me, my lack of education or
poor health may limit and control my decisions; these restrictions will gain mastery over me. I
cannot be considered as free if difficulties outside my control have somehow restricted my
ability to act. But if internal limits, such as knowledge, can control us, then perhaps our desires
can exert this same sort of control. If reason is not ruling, can we truly be called free?
According to this strong interpretation of positive liberty, freedom is not simply about
acting as one may wish. If the self acts only based upon the desire, then the desire governs the
self; the individual has become enslaved to his or her passions. To be truly free, one must act in
accordance with reason, which would then reflect certain categorical imperatives, as reason is
common to all people. This is why humans can be, paradoxically, ―forced to be free‖ (Curtis 20).
In this view, it is up to the community to implement laws to help mold and govern the behavior
of those who would enslave themselves. ―The individuals see the good they reject; the public
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wills the good it does not see. All stand equally in need of guidance. The former must be
compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know
what it wills‖ (Curtis 25). If, Rousseau proclaims, people were to act in accordance with their
own will, rather than what he calls the General Will, which is a manifestation of the rational,
moral law, then, ―[they] should not have been free‖ (Curtis 33).
This exaltation of positive liberty without any reference to the autonomy of the individual
leads to what Alexis de Tocqueville calls ―soft despotism,‖ where the government bends and
guides citizens to fulfill what it sees as a ―free‖ course of action (Tocqueville). Isaiah Berlin
points out that,

It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does not;
and even to ignore his wishes for its – and his – sake; and a very different one to
say that he has eo ipso chosen it, not indeed consciously, not as he seems in
everyday life, but in his role as a rational self which his empirical self may not
know – the ‗real‘ self which discerns the good, and cannot help choosing it once it
is revealed (―Liberty‖ 180).

The danger in positive liberty is that it can mean the complete loss of liberty. Once one
accepts that the individual has no right to autonomy, and that it is the function of government to
perfect Man, one is placed in, ―a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to
bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‗real‘ selves, in the secure
knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, fulfillment of duty, wisdom, a just
society, self-fulfillment) must be identical with his freedom – the free choice of his ‗true‘, albeit
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submerged and inarticulate, self‖ (―Liberty‖ 180). Liberty as potential, or positive liberty,
degrades into totalitarianism without the benefits negative liberty provides, as ―this monstrous
impersonation…is at the heart of all political theories of self-actualization‖ (―Liberty‖ 180).
And so how is it that these two forms of liberty are to be reconciled? Rather than a liberty
as autonomy or a liberty as potential, we must balance the two in favor of liberty as dignity.
Liberty as dignity means that people must have a relative level of autonomy in order to make
moral decisions, but must also have adequate means of supporting their attempts to achieve
certain ends once those ends have been decided upon. Liberty as dignity is ultimately rooted in
Kant‘s second formulation of the categorical imperative – that people should never be treated
solely as means, but also as ends in themselves (Curtis 46). Rights must then be actualized in
such a way that would balance negative and positive liberty, which would be accounted for in the
parabolic theory of rights.
If we apply liberty as dignity to some of the situations in which liberty as autonomy and
liberty as potential failed to account for our intuitive conception of liberty, we can see why it
succeeds. Liberty as autonomy is unable to prevent the murderer from killing an innocent person
because it would refute itself by infringing upon the murderer‘s autonomy. However, liberty as
dignity is perfectly able to intervene, as stopping one person from killing another does not
infringe upon the dignity of the first, though being killed is an infringement of one‘s dignity.
Additionally, while liberty as dignity can seek to provide the necessary prerequisites that allow
for an individual to achieve his or her goals, it does not fall into the danger of totalitarianism as
liberty as potential does, for such heavy-handed compulsion would ultimately treat individuals as
means to an end (even if it is the proper end to which they ought aspire). While there can be a
public endorsement of certain moral goods through restrictions in private behavior, these
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restrictions are necessarily limited, and certain activities that may be considered immoral can be
allowed to remain legal so that the dignity of individual moral choices remains. The principles
behind this balance will be expounded upon in the following section.

The Private and Public Good

While the preceding analysis gives us a reasonable understanding of the relationship of
liberties, there is still the question of what sort of practical principles would be best able to
reflect these theoretical ideals. What sorts of limitations, if any, can the state and society
reasonably put on individuals acting within a private setting? According to the dominant Millian
approach, society ought to embrace a ―no harm principle,‖ wherein, ―the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others‖ (Mill 48). Such an approach acknowledges that each individual is his
or her own rational, autonomous agent, treats people as ends in themselves, allows for people to
participate in ―private experimentation,‖ and recognizes the fallibility of laws and traditions.
However, a problem with this argument, one that has been noted by numerous political
theorists, is that defining ―harm‖ can be an especially difficult enterprise (Rosen & Wolff 135136). Additionally, our private choices have enormous implications toward our public behavior,
and ignoring the social bonds that connect those within society could be detrimental to the civic
health of society. If every person chose, in their private lives, to lie to one another, the public
realm would cease to function. If a large percentage of the population were racist, no matter how
egalitarian public institutions may be, those private beliefs would generate public injustice.
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While there are some distinctions that can be made between the public and the private, they are
ultimately intertwined and necessarily affect one another.
This was the sort of criticism one of John Stuart Mill‘s greatest critics, Patrick Devlin,
leveled against him in his book The Enforcement of Morals. Devlin argued that, because certain
traditional standards helped to shape and mold us, and because it is due to our customs and social
history that we are able to enjoy certain rights, we owe a certain fealty to tradition and custom
(104-105). A people have a right to defend their way of life, to maintain a common moral
framework. A state is not simply a collection of neutral institutions which act as a skeleton for
society – it is an expression of the social norms that currently exist, and thus can endorse certain
ways of behaving (Devlin 109).
Devlin presents a thought experiment in which there exist a band of one hundred people,
ninety of whom are virtuous and ten of whom are vicious. He considers what would happen if
this band was a social club, saying that if that were the case the solution would be easy, as ―the
vicious ten would be expelled and no one would think the expulsion harsh‖ (106). However, in a
society, ―a man has his whole social life‖ (106); society is different from a social club as it
makes up the entirety of the individual‘s narrative. Additionally, it seems extreme and
impractical to kick out the offenders, as ―Men can no longer be driven into the desert‖ (106).
And so Devlin proposes an alternative solution. According to him the ninety are justified in
restricting some of the ten‘s negative liberty in order to ―reform‖ them and actualize their
positive liberty. Otherwise, the ninety virtuous, and their descendents, would be left, ―relying on
the strength of their own virtue to resist contamination‖ (106), potentially, ―convert[ing] to the
vicious‖ (Devlin 106). A key difference between Devlin‘s position and an extreme position
derived from positive liberty is that, unlike with positive liberty, Devlin is not seeking to perfect
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those who are vicious, but rather defend the rights and liberties of those who are virtuous.
Devlin then critiques Mill‘s argument from epistemic uncertainty, where moral diversity
is needed in order to have a competition of values, which would eventually demonstrate to
society which values are the best. He says that,

A man does not as a rule commit bigamy because he wants to experiment with
two wives instead of one. He does not as a rule lie with his daughter or sister
because he thinks that an incestuous relationship can be a good one but because
he finds in it a way of satisfying his lust in the home. He does not keep a brothel
so as to prove the value of promiscuity but so as to make money (Devlin 107).

Devlin, like Mill, sees freedom as instrumental, and thus concludes that there are certain
things that one can reasonably assume are not being done out of a belief that they are reflections
of the good life (108). He also notes the traditional Burkean argument that tradition has survived
because it reflects what is good, and thus if one took a stand from epistemic uncertainty one
would have to endorse tradition within society as it has greater warrant than ―progressive‖
changes. Finally, Devlin exemplifies the belief rooted in positive liberty that, ―Freedom to do
what you know to be bad is worthless,‖ as such freedom is ultimately enslavement (108).
But, while some of the problems Devlin brings up about Mill‘s harm principle have
merit, his theory delves into dangerous territory. Though he does not embrace positive liberty for
the sake of those who have enslaved themselves, he ultimately treads near its totalitarian
temptation. Devlin, seeing people not as individuals, but as parts in a social moral fabric that
must maintain itself, declares, ―Can then the judgement of society sanction every invasion of a

88

man‘s privacy, however extreme? Theoretically that must be so; there is no theoretical limitation.
Society must be the judge of what is necessary to its own integrity if only because there is no
other tribunal to which the question can be submitted‖ (118).
Both Mill and Devlin‘s proposals on how to balance the public good with private
interests are problematic, though in the end Mill‘s approach has proven far more popular, and
with good reason. Devlin‘s argument leads to the danger of a tyranny of the majority, a risk that
has been identified in democracy from Plato, through Tocqueville and Mill, and still widely
acknowledged in contemporary political theory. Devlin fails to take into account the right of
individuals to have a private life, even if aspects of that life may impact others indirectly.
However, Mill‘s no harm principle fails to recognize the paradox of public neutrality, which I
will elaborate upon in the next section. He also has a problem in determining how to deal with
indirect harm, and through this critique I have developed my own principle of liberty.
It has been implied in previous sections and chapters that negative rights increase
negative liberties and positive rights increase positive liberties, with some theorists even using
the terms ―rights‖ and ―liberties‖ interchangeably. Indeed, such a view is common among those
who choose to make such a distinction. For many it may seem self-evident that each sort of right
and liberty are connected, as having a prohibitory right allows one to have the liberty of
remaining unmolested, while having an obligatory right aids one in achieving one‘s goals. And
while it does seem that there is a strong correlation between negative rights and liberties and
positive rights and liberties, it is not absolute.
Let us look at speeding laws as an example. When the state creates a speeding law,
banning a person from going above a certain speed along a particular road, it has created a
positive right. We are each obligated to drive at or below a given speed; if the state actualized
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negative rights when it comes to speed limits we would be allowed to drive as fast as we wished.
And yet by creating this positive right, the state actually increases negative liberty. Compelling
people to act in such a way diminishes some negative liberty – the freedom to drive as fast as we
wish – but by doing so the state drastically reduces the number of accidents each year. Whenever
a person crashes their car into another person‘s car, the second person has had their negative
liberty infringed upon.
Mill‘s no harm principle only looked at the individual, and whether a particular
individual would cause harm to others should a regulation governing our private affairs be lifted.
But, in the case of speeding laws, one individual may be able to speed as much as they want and
never get into an accident. This is why we must take into account the aggregate increase or
decrease of negative liberty. While a particular individual may not hit or be hit should speed
limits be lifted, through the creation of a positive right the overall amount of negative liberty can
actually be increased.
Another example that can be seen takes place within the economic sphere. While it can
be argued that a laissez-faire system best reflects the greatest actualization of negative rights, if
the market is left to its own devices the aggregate level of negative liberty will be diminished.
Without the food, safety, health, and environmental regulations that are put into place, which are
all positive rights, people will inevitably be harmed due the excesses of the market, limiting their
negative liberty.
The reverse is also true. If a government chooses to create a new entitlement program in
order to increase positive liberty, it is possible for positive liberty to actually diminish due to the
poor management or structure of the program. By taxing its citizens, the government reduces
their ability to make use of their money to achieve their desired goals. To offset this, the
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government is obligated to use the funds in such a way that a greater number of people are able
to make use of more positive liberty than they would be able to do otherwise. But if such a
program proves to be less efficient than the market in actualizing the ends people seek, it would
be preferable to keep more negative rights than positive rights, which would then lead to a
greater amount of positive liberty. Thus, the principle of liberty also gives us a practical way to
determine when to stop actualizing positive rights, as a program such as the one described would
go past the golden mean that is targeted in the parabolic theory of rights.
When it comes to the actualization of positive liberty, it is almost always better to focus
on creating programs that help the least well off. This is because within society they are the
segment that is most limited in their ability to achieve their ends, meaning that they would gain
most from said programs. As the income levels of those for whom positive rights is being created
increases, the marginal utility of the positive rights actualized decreases. Thus, the entitlement
programs that most efficiently actualize positive liberty target the poor and disadvantaged.
We can then apply this sort of reasoning to private choices, such as drugs, alcohol, or
prostitution. One may determine that the amount of negative liberty that would be increased by
banning alcohol, through fewer deaths due to drunk drivers or abuses caused by alcoholics,
would not counterbalance the collective negative liberty lost by all those who are able to enjoy
alcohol socially. Additionally, one would have to take into account the increase in crime and
gang violence that would come from banning alcohol, as seen during the Prohibition Era.
In contrast, one may determine that heroin ought to be banned, even though Mill‘s no
harm principle would claim it exists in the private sphere and is therefore available for private
experimentation. While particular individuals may be able to use it in ways that would not cause
harm to others, because of its highly addictive nature, and because it cannot be enjoyed casually
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as a social drug, as alcohol can be, on the whole heroin may be seen as lowering liberty within
society. Legalizing it would cause its use to become more widespread, and addicts would be
predisposed to committing violent acts against others within society in order to get money to pay
for the drug.
The principle of liberty allows for a proper understanding of the role liberty plays in the
private and public sphere. However, it alone is not adequate. While Devlin‘s argument
concerning public moral principles eventually went too far, his rejection of public neutrality in
lou of public values has some warrant, with such a concept being adopted by contemporary
communitarians. In the next, and final section, I will argue against public neutrality and in favor
of a principle of morality that can be used to supplement the principle of liberty.

Public Neutrality or Public Values?

As outlined in the very first section of this thesis, by denying ontology much of
contemporary political philosophy has fallen into relativism, and when institutionalized as a
principle this relativism takes the form of public neutrality. Modern contractarianism and
utilitarianism look to the preferences of individuals to determine what sorts of political
arrangements ought to be constructed, and neither bothers to ask what integral virtues are needed
to live a good life. Man‘s purpose has been removed from the objective sphere; it is now
commonly understood as a subjective undertaking.
This is why relativism becomes the logical end of Enlightenment political philosophy.
When morality is rooted in the individual, the individual becomes the sole arbiter of that
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morality. When discussing the crisis of liberalism, Strauss notes that this crisis exists because
―liberalism has abandoned its absolutist basis and is trying to become entirely relativistic‖
(Wiggins 140). There are no intrinsic goods; there are no objective final ends. Morality without
teleology is rationality without reason. We are each the makers of our own ethic because we are
rational agents, but there is no final reason that influences our decisions aside from our own costbenefit analysis as to how we want to live. Morality without teleology degrades into a series of
preference statements, and society without that final cause of public virtue becomes limited to a
union of self-interested agents.
This mentality is what helped lead to the paradigm shift in ethics and politics during the
Enlightenment, where politics began to be seen purely as a means to power. If there are no
intrinsically valuable final human ends to which politics must aspire, then all things become
instrumental. Politics becomes a means to whatever ends we desire it to fulfill, and because each
person has a different ordering of preferences, politics devolves into a series of power
relationships in pursuit of those preferences, rather than a civic expression toward the public
good. Strauss writes that the wise and virtuous only rule because, ―their whole life is devoted to
the pursuit of something which is absolutely higher in dignity than any human things – the
unchangeable truth‖ (―NRH‖ 151). For the ancients, justice is a transcendent good rooted in
human nature, and its fulfillment calls the wise to public life. Without this transcendence, when
nomos replaces physis, politics loses virtue and is left only with the power authority provides.
Strauss identifies Machiavelli as the turning point when he argued that public goods can
and ought to be manipulated by those in positions of authority within society in order to maintain
their power and prestige (―HPP‖ 272-277). The idea that politics was a series of power
relationships was rooted in liberal thought by Hobbes, for whom morality was derived from
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power, as power was the basis of the social contract. While later liberals are far less authoritarian
than Hobbes, his language concerning power changed the way political philosophers looked at
politics. The laws of nature were based in a desire to preserve oneself, and so society came to be
viewed as a grouping of individuals unified only due to their self-interest and need for selfpreservation. No longer does the city exist for the pursuit of virtue; it exists so that we do not
have to return to the terror of the state of nature (―HPP‖ 272-277). The more power a person
possesses, the more likely that person is to survive, and so the political community becomes
atomized, with each individual seeking his or her own ends. Power and individuality are
inseparable, and both are at the heart of liberalism.
This view finally came to its full expression with Nietzsche's master-slave morality and
will to power. Liberalism‘s deification of the individual allowed for the rise of Nietzsche‘s
Übermensch, a person so removed from social mores that he constructs his own hero morality
and is capable of separating himself from the slavishness of the community with which he is a
part. It also seems that Nietzsche‘s will to power is the end result of liberalism‘s acceptance of
Hobbes‘ reasons for communal relationships. The purpose of living and the driving force of
humanity is to gain power. Power, security, and happiness exist for the individual and the
individual alone.
Nietzsche can be seen as a messenger, heralding liberalism‘s destruction of the political
life. He does not necessarily propose ideas because they are his own; rather, he comments on the
modernity he saw coming to fruition. He sees modern society for what it actually is, and,
assuming that we have all accepted this way of life, demonstrates how horrific our decision truly
is. One of the reasons much of philosophy in the twentieth century can be seen as a response to
Nietzsche is because he forces us to see the logical result of the Enlightenment.
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Public neutrality is an outgrowth of these principles, removing questions about the nature
of the good life from the public sphere, replacing them with democratic mechanisms and
procedures. Such institutions may allow us to maintain our rights, but they do not meet the
existential needs of human beings, for we are, as Aristotle famously stated, ―political animals‖
(―Politics‖). Power has become justice, for as long as the preferences we generate and impose on
others in the public sphere exist within the liberal framework, they are seen as just. In much of
contemporary political philosophy, it seems that Callicles and Thrasymachus have won out over
Socrates.
If there is no objective good, or final human end, then politics must be about power. We
each seek to impose our own preferences into public policy, knowing that those preferences are
incommensurable with the preferences of others. But for us, as rational agents, to seek our own
happiness we must do so; if we do not we run the danger of seeing others' preferences, which
may retard our own, become institutionalized. If there is no objective good that social institutions
can reflect, and if politics is about the competition for power, each preference begins to compete
and force its way into the state‘s public sphere. The danger to political stability this framework
generates is the reason for liberalism's reliance on public neutrality.
Public neutrality serves as a bulwark against the undemocratic impulses the need for
power creates, for it limits political power projections from becoming totalitarian in nature by
sanctifying decisions made in the private realm. Because most contemporary political
philosophy, including both libertarianism and egalitarianism, accept some version of public
neutrality, their imposition of preferences in the public sphere is restricted from extending too far
into the private realm. Without this framework, contemporary Enlightenment ideologies would
move from what Strauss calls ―gentle‖ nihilism to the ―brutal‖ nihilism of other Enlightenment
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ideologies, such as communism and fascism.
However, there are some serious theoretical issues with public neutrality. MacIntyre
observes that it is a modern deception; public neutrality itself constructs a particular kind of
citizen with a specific sort of virtue (68). There will always be public virtues that help to develop
a certain mindset through which citizens understand morality and politics; there can be no such
thing as a truly neutral public sphere. Public neutrality falls into the same contradiction that
befell liberty as autonomy; to claim that no moral imperatives can be imposed upon the public
sphere is itself an imposition of a particular moral imperative on the public sphere.
To limit public values also seems to miss part of the purpose of the political life. Virtue
must be practiced, and the law allows for legislators to create institutions that aid citizens in
practicing virtue. For Aristotle and many pre-Enlightenment political philosophers, the idea of
purposefully attempting to remove public virtue from the discussion would have seemed
antithetical to the entire idea of politics. Thomas Aquinas notes, ―it is evident that the proper
effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is ‗that which makes its
subject good,‘ it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good,
either simply or in some particular respect‖ (Aquinas). Politics does not exist in a vacuum. A just
society cannot be formed simply through the correct application of certain principles within
public institutions – the citizens of that society must maintain a virtuous character. No matter
how just the public institutions may be, if the society is filled with racists or sexists it will fall
into injustice, as such a society ―fails to cultivate the qualities of character that equip citizens to
share in self-rule‖ (―Democracy‘s Discontent‖ 24).
Contemporary liberalism, which includes both libertarianism and egalitarianism, while at
times rejecting the notion that it does inculcate certain virtues, has to an extent come to terms
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with its effect on the nature of its citizenry. John Rawls discusses this in Political Liberalism,
where he argues that liberalism, when used as the framework for political systems, creates
―liberal citizens,‖ who would then be predisposed to participate in ―public reason‖ – a way of
making political decisions that is exclusive to liberal societies (312). This idea is expanded upon
by Macedo, who labels the political behavior people adopt in democracies as ―liberal virtues‖
(4).
However, these are only ―procedural‖ virtues, with Sandel criticizing the Rawlsian
conception of the state as merely a ―procedural republic‖, where ―our political discourse…has
come to reflect the liberal resolve that government be neutral on moral and religious questions,
that matters of policy and law be debated and decided without reference to any particular
conception of the good life‖ (―Democracy‘s Discontent‖ 24).
The virtues contemporary liberals talk about are not virtues in the classical sense –
character traits that promote living the good life. These virtues are nihilistic virtues; they are
virtues of non-interference and relativity, where the only public good recognized is tolerance.
Because liberalism affirms the right of every individual to pursue his or her own conception of
the good, certain procedures, called ―liberal virtues,‖ are implemented to limit society‘s ability to
influence its citizens‘ private moral decisions or conception of the good life. We have
wholeheartedly adopted Mill‘s no harm principle and advocate for citizens to participate in
private experimentation without reference to whether it allows for the maintenance of a civic and
virtuous society.
But we must be careful not to tread the road Devlin traversed. There is a reason for
contemporary liberalism‘s wariness toward public values – throughout history public values
have, in many cases, been used as a tool of oppression. We must not glorify the ancient form of
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liberty without understanding the reasons for its eventual rejection. Much of what the
Enlightenment brought us – the power and dignity of the individual to make his or her own
choice – must be sanctified in any theory of rights and justice. But a reformulation of the way in
which we think about public value must still be had. There must be a paradigm shift in our
conception of politics away from Hobbes‘ discourse on power and back toward the ancients‘
understanding of public virtue.
The only sort of private behavior that can be legitimately legislated against would be
private behavior that degrades the dignity of the individual – and even then not all cases would
be justifiably legislated against. The scope of the principle of morality must be closely managed,
left wide enough to allow society to reflect its moral values, yet narrow enough not to infringe
upon certain basic rights. In these cases phronesis – the application of practical wisdom – will
have to be used to determine what sorts of activities ought to be legislated against. The principle
of morality takes two forms:

1. The principle of morality as applied to dignity – A private activity may be
made to be illegal if it degrades the dignity of a human person.

2. The principle of morality as applied to public values – A private activity that
does not degrade the dignity of a human person, but is seen as violating the
common moral norms, can be disincentivised through legislation.

The principle of morality is closely tied to liberty as dignity and the principle of liberty.
If, for example, society were to see the private decision of drunkenness as an activity that it
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would like to regulate or eliminate, it would have to first look to the principle of liberty. Would
banning alcohol increase or decrease liberty overall? If it is determined that banning alcohol
would increase liberty, at that point the principle of morality would not need to be appealed to
and alcohol could be justifiably banned. However, if it were found that liberty would decline if
alcohol were banned, the principle of morality would come into play.
Society would have to investigate whether the first principle of morality could be
justifiably appealed to in order to ban alcohol. Because morality is derived from human nature,
human nature is intrinsically valuable, as morality is valued as an end. Because human nature is
intrinsically valuable, persons must be treated with dignity, and thus are always as ends in
themselves. However, it does not necessarily require an external actor to degrade a person‘s
dignity; individuals are perfectly capable of acting in ways that degrade their own basic dignity.
Thus, because laws are put in place to protect and enhance the dignity of the citizenry, should the
consumption of alcohol be seen as degrading the person‘s dignity, turning the individual into
solely a means to an end, then alcohol could be justifiably banned. However, drunkenness does
not turn people into means, and thus could not be banned based on the first principle of morality.
The final principle that can be appealed to is the second principle of morality. Because
public neutrality is contradictory, and because a democratic state is a reflection of society, the
state is able, through the consent of the people, to create public values through the creation of
incentives and disincentives. Thus, ―sin taxes‖ can be imposed, public service announcements
can be made, and certain restrictions can be set in place for sectors of the economy that are seen
as promoting a way of life that does not express what the good life may be.
Returning to the first principle of morality, an emblematic example of a prohibition that
can be made based on this principle would be the prohibition on prostitution. It can strongly be
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argued that, after taking into account all relevant factors, prostitution would increase the overall
level of liberty within society. However, it also seems that, based on Kant‘s arguments
concerning love and sex6, paying a prostitute for sex would degrade the dignity of both parties,
turning them into simply a means to an end.
Because a society‘s laws reflect its moral beliefs, one may choose to ban the practice of
prostitution even if it conforms to the principle of liberty. To do so would be a public recognition
that persons cannot be bought, sold, or rented, that love and sex are integral and meaningful
human values, and that society does not see the unadulterated objectification of another person as
a good character trait to possess. Aristotle observes the power of the law to inculcate certain
moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, writing ―Legislators make citizens good by forming
habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their
mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one‖ (32).
It may be asked, if prostitution can be banned because it degrades human dignity, can
something like one-night stands be banned as well, as they are quite similar in the fact that they
turn the consenting parties into a means? This is where the importance of phronesis comes into
play. First, it seems as if it would be incredibly difficult if not impossible to enforce such a law,
and to do so would require an enormous invasion of privacy – so much though that people‘s
social rights would most likely be violated. Second, while the immoral transaction is readily
apparent in the case of prostitution, the state cannot know what is in the minds of consenting
adults who need no other incentive but one another when it comes to sex. The transaction of
money, goods, or labor for sex is a blatant demonstration of the lack of a bond between the two

6

One could of course reformulate Kant‘s argument to see love, or perhaps a non-marital
romantic relationship, as being enough to view one‘s significant other as an end when engaging
in sexual activities, rather than strictly defining marriage as the only indicator.
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parties. Without such a transaction, the state has no means of determining the exact state of mind
of the two parties involved.
The principle of morality gives a community the ability to affirm its values through the
state. We cannot see ourselves as wholly independent individuals, and must acknowledge the
interconnectedness of all people within society. The egalitarianism proposed by Rawls and the
libertarianism proposed by Nozick are hollow because they miss the fundamental point of
politics – to promote the common good, and aid citizens in living the good life. However, the
principle of morality should not simply be thought of as a ―socially conservative‖ or ―traditional‖
principle. Indeed, it can, and should, be a mechanism for social change and justice.
We can look, for example, at the Civil Rights movement in America in the middle of the
20th century. In order to prevent southern states from continuing to institute policies that
discriminated against African Americans, the Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
Much of the bill‘s constitutional justification was rooted in the 14th and 15th amendments, which,
respectively, guaranteed equal protection and voting rights (―Civil Rights Act‖). However, Titles
II and VII, which prohibited businesses from discriminating against clients or engaging in
discriminatory hiring practices, were more difficult to justify, as the 14th and 15th amendments
applied to federal, state, and local governments, not to private citizens or businesses
(―Amendments 11-27‖). Many libertarians since have made the case that, while discrimination is
immoral, we cannot regulate private behavior in such a manner, and that private businesses
should be allowed to discriminate if they so choose.
To justify Titles II and VII, Congress turned to the commerce clause of the Constitution,
which grants the federal government the ability to regulate interstate commerce. Because
businesses engage in interstate commerce, it was argued that the federal government is justified
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in preventing them from engaging in discriminatory activities because it puts a burden on that
commerce. The Supreme Court upheld this argument in Katzenbach v. McClung, stating that, in
the case of the food industry, ―racial discrimination by such restaurants burdened interstate
trade‖ (―Katzenbach v. McClung‖). Even businesses that do not explicitly engage in interstate
commerce could be regulated, with the court ruling in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States that, ―Congress had power to enact appropriate legislation with regard to a place of public
accommodation such as appellant's motel even if it is assumed to be of a purely "local" character,
as Congress' power over interstate commerce extends to the regulation of local incidents thereof
which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce‖ (―Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States‖).
While the Civil Rights Act and these subsequent rulings helped to bring about the sort of
racial reform that had been sorely needed for generations in America, they seem to have missed
the point about exactly why racial discrimination is wrong. Because of our strict adherence to
public neutrality, private businesses could only be compelled to end discrimination by stretching
the commerce clause, a constitutional power that deals with economic regulation, beyond its
original intent. Rather than expressing what was truly problematic about private discrimination –
that it devalues the intrinsic worth of certain human beings, that it violates people‘s inalienable
right to moral equality, and that it breaks apart social bonds by creating ―otherness‖ within
society – the legislature and court used an economic regulation to ban it. It seems that, if it could
be shown that racial discrimination did not have a negative effect on interstate commerce, the
court would be forced to allow it to continue. Racial discrimination is wrong because it violates
people‘s basic dignity, not because it ―might have a substantial and harmful effect
upon…commerce‖ (―Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States‖).
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In 1955 Rosa Parks famously refused to give up her bus seat to a white passenger,
leading to the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the eventual court decision of Browder v. Gayle,
which found the bus segregation to be unconstitutional. The court claimed that the laws violated
the 14th amendment, but this only applied because the buses were state-run (―Browder v.
Gayle‖). If, however, the buses were privately owned and operated, it seems difficult for the
courts to have justified their decision under the 14th amendment, and would most likely have had
to appeal to the commerce clause.
We can imagine the principle of liberty being unable to effectively prevent this sort of
discrimination. It could be argued that, when looking at the passengers, no aggregate freedom
has been lost, as, while the black passengers would have lost the freedom to sit, the white
passengers would have gained the freedom to sit. In fact, by creating a law that restricted these
policies, the business‘ right to structure itself would be lost. No one is being physically harmed,
and blacks do not need to ride these buses, with the bus company owners not having any sort of
obligation to serve them.
While some of these points may be true, this is why the principle of liberty must be
supplemented by the principle of morality – the principle of morality prevents the state from
transforming into a ―procedural republic‖ and allows justice and rights to truly instantiate
themselves. This sort of morally arbitrary discrimination would be prohibited by the first
formulation of the principle of morality, as discrimination infringes upon persons basic dignity.
Thus, whether, as in this case, we are dealing with bus companies, or as with the previous two,
we are dealing with restaurants and hotels, the state would be justified in banning such practices,
regardless of effect on interstate commerce.
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We cannot view ourselves as atomized individuals, acting completely independently of
one another within society, only needing laws to prevent us from directly harming each other.
The social fabric must be maintained, and the principle of morality allows for us to affirm our
equal right to citizenship and our basic social values. We are all interconnected, and our social
relationships have moral import as they help to develop our life‘s narrative. Banning degrading
activities like prostitution and discrimination, or regulating potentially destructive substances
like alcohol, allow us to affirm to our children and ourselves our community‘s moral character.
The principles outlined in this chapter and the last demonstrate the importance of
federalism when it comes to creating good public policy. Under a federalist system, different
state and regions are able to experiment, increasing or decreasing positive and negative rights
and liberties, as well as experimenting with different expressions of social values. By allowing
for this sort of experimentation, we are able to maintain a dynamic system and avoid a dogmatic
public moral framework. Because there states can engage in experimentation, it can become
apparent as to what combination of rights and liberties is most effective. This competition allows
for changes in the public moral paradigm, ensuring a dynamic competition of ideas and beliefs.
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Conclusion

Discussions of rights and liberty are central to political philosophy. They form the basis
for our justification of social institutions, and are the foundation for any debate related to public
policy. And the modern theories of justice ultimately attain their ideal of justice through a proper
ordering of rights and liberty. What makes these concepts so important in political philosophy is
that they deal with the very core of what the discussion of politics is: how should human beings
arrange political, economic, and social institutions?
But the perfect fulfillment of justice within society can never occur. The example I gave
of an institution exemplifying the principles of justice, in which the criminal got what he was
entitled to and what he deserved, is impossible to replicate in every instance. Thus, the purpose
of politics is not to achieve justice; it is to construct institutions that best reflect justice based on
the rights and liberties people naturally possess. Justice is an event horizon, and no matter how
quickly we try to move towards it, we will never attain it. However, by seeking justice we move
society forward, ensuring that the dignity and respect people are owed is reflected to a greater
degree in our laws than they once were.
Natural law is a natural foundation for rights and liberties. It is the original foundation,
and while its moral objectivism has been part of the reason for its derision, such a perspective is
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necessary when engaging in philosophy. If there is no physis to the subject being discussed, then
we will have moved back to ancestor worship, as with Patrick Devlin, or will replace ancestor
worship with preference, as with John Stuart Mill. Neither is a proper foundation for politics, and
neither can fully account for our intuitions and moral relations. There must be something
objective in ethics and politics for us to reference, for without a common reference point debate,
and thereby politics, cannot be had. Both myth and preference are wholly internal mechanisms,
and cannot be the basis of an external mechanism like politics.
But natural law does not fall into the sort of dogmatism that can characterize other ethical
theories which claim moral objectivity. Unlike divine command theory it is not rooted in
mysticism, for there are rational, empirical facts that are used as bases for natural law‘s ethical
claims. Natural law is similar to science in that it proclaims there to be an objective truth within
its particular field and believes that truth to be intelligible. However, it does not claim that
whatever particular moral imperatives it holds at any particular moment in history are
necessarily true. They are simply the collection of moral imperatives that have the greatest
amount of warrant based on our current understanding of human nature. Science goes through
the same sort of process, acting as if a theory is true because there is greater justification for that
theory than any other. However, both science and natural law must be willing to change their
paradigms should new evidence come to light. This constantly evolving dialectic is emblematic
of any field demonstrating a healthy quest for truth.
The political philosophy I have put forward is somewhat difficult to pin down. It contains
some aspects of libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism, but can be considered as
none of the above. If libertarianism is the ―right-wing‖ and egalitarianism is the ―left-wing‖ of
liberalism, then perhaps this theory could be considered the ―right-wing‖ to communitarian‘s
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―left-wing.‖ It is heavily influenced by Leo Strauss, who himself was difficult to categorize and
whose thought was predominantly influenced by classical philosophy. Communitarianism is a
modern reinterpretation of classical Greek political philosophy, and so it seems somewhat
appropriate to see this theory as an ideological partner to it. However, what makes it distinct
from communitarianism is that while it affirms many communitarian criticisms of contemporary
political philosophy, it also firmly rejects culture as the basis of morality, instead advocating a
return to the belief in objective moral laws.
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